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Getting to Know You: An Expanded
Approach to Capital Jury Selection
Samuel P. Newton*
The Colorado Method of capitaljury selection is a widely embraced strategy defense
attorneys use to selectjurorsduringvoir dire, in which attorneys rank eachjurorexclusively on

the likelihood that the jurorwill votefor death. The method could benefitfrom some expansion.
Not all defense lawyers have access to Colorado-Method-basedtraining. In innocence cases,
defense lawyers should soften discussions of punishment prior to guilt since this tactic
predisposesjuries to vote for death. Nor do jurors' views or positions on the death penalty

guarantee theireventual votes. While capitaljuries are already inclinedto give deathsentences
generally, social science researchers have determinedthat numerous case-specific andjurorspecfifcfactors significantlyaffect jurors'votes. I review these researchfindings and conclude
that capital defense attorneys would be better served, if courts allow them the time and the
resources, by questioning and rankingjurors on a broader set offactors. I propose that with
more information in hand defense attorneys would improve their odds ofselecting ajury more

inclinedto impose a life sentence.
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On July 20, 2012, in Aurora, Colorado, James Holmes entered a
Century 16 theater playing The DarkKnight Rises and, using an assault
rifle, a shotgun, and a handgun, opened fire on the crowd, killing twelve
people and wounding fifty-eight.' The victims' families and their
community clamored for justice. 2 Sandy Phillips, mother of one of the
victims, said she would never empathize or sympathize with "the
person that butchered [her] children." 3
But Holmes's defense attorneys had a plan. Using "a carefully
calibrated jury selection strategy" known as the Colorado Method, they
questioned prospective jurors almost exclusively about their views on
the death penalty, and used tactics and techniques to place some of the
moral weight of the life and death decision directly on the jurors.4
1.

Dan Frosch & Kirk Johnson, Gunman Kills 12 in Colorado, Reviving Gun

Debate, N.Y. TIMES (July 20, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/21/us/shooting-atcolorado-theater-showing-batman-movie.html [https://perma.cc/HH8Q-BTJZ];Deandra Tan,
DeconstructingAurora: How Hollywood Averted Cultural Backlash in the Face of National
Tragedy, 10 YALE J. SoC. 26, 28, -31-32 (2013).
2.
See Jack Healy & Serge F. Kovaleski, Before and After Massacre, Puzzles Line
Suspect's Path, N.Y. TIMES (July 21, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/22/us/painand-puzzles-in-wake-of-deadly-colorado-attack.html; Richard Corliss, Banefor Real: How the
Aurora Killings Shattered Movie Fantasy, TIME (July 22, 2012), https://entertainment.time.
com/2012/07/22/bane-for-real-how-the-aurora-killings-shattered-movie-fantasy/ (writing that
Holmes "imposed a sick sense of deja vu on Denver-area citizens, who must cordon off a still
larger part of their hearts for perpetual mouming."); Colorado Theater Shooter James
Holmes's Life Spared by Single Juror, CBC (Aug. 14, 2015, 6:41 PM), https://www.cbc.ca/
news/world/colorado-theatre-shooter-james-hohnes-s-life-spared-by-single-juror-1.3192076
(indicating that half the victims wanted Holmes's execution, while others favored life "because
they thought they would never actually see Holmes executed").
Aurora Victim's Mother: James Holmes 'Butchered'My Daughter, NBC NEWS
3.
(May 7, 2015, 11:24 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/aurora-victims-motherjames-holmes-butchered-my-daughter-n355351 [https://perma.cc/82GP-ANPN].
4.
John Ingold, Defense Jury Strategy Could Decide Aurora Theater Shooting Trial,
DENVER POST (Mar. 28, 2015, 12:15 PM), https://www.denverpost.com/2015/03/28/defensejury-strategy-could-decide-aurora-theater-shooting-trial/ [https://perma.cc/HW3Z-XZT8];

Jordan Steffen, How the Aurora Theater Shooting Defense Laid the Groundworkfor a Life
Sentence, DENVER POST (Aug. 8, 2015, 1:24 PM), https://www.denverpost.com/2015/08/08/
how-the-aurora-theater-shooting-defense-laid-the-groundwork-for-a-life-sentence/.
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Among other strategies, the lawyers explained that the law did not
require a death sentence, that their decision was a deeply personal and
moral one, and that they did not have to surrender their decision to other
jurors.5 Their approach' paid off. One juror voted for life, two were
undecided, and, after only seven hours, the other jurors cordially and
respectfully deferred to their fellow jurors' opinions, sentencing
Holmes to life. 6
Experts and others called the life verdict a "titanic" validation of
the Colorado Method, which to many "is responsible in part for the
precipitous drop in death verdicts happening all over the country."7 As
the Colorado State Public Defender declares on its website, this method
is "the gold standard of effective capital defense." 8 I will more fully
explain the Colorado Method in Part H.
But the Colorado Method should be expanded. Take the case of
eighteen-year-old Jeremy Gross, who killed his coworker at a
convenience store by shooting him repeatedly.9 One juror told lawyers
during voir dire that she believed a person who takes a life deserves
death. Another juror explained that "the death penalty was not used
often enough." 10 But surprisingly, when these two jurors heard about
Gross's extremely tragic upbringing, they drew on their own similar
life experiences, empathized with Gross, and ultimately persuaded the
rest of the jury to vote for life." These jurors probably would have been
excused under the Colorado Method because of their strong views on
capital punishment, but they were the jurors who made a difference in
the verdict.

5.
Ingold, supra note 4; Steffen, supra note 4.
6.
Steffen, supra note 4.
7.
Ingold, supra note 4 (noting that the Colorado Method "is now being used by
defense attorneys across the country"); Macradee Aegerter, Defense Attorneys Use 'Colorado
Method'to Save Theater Shooterfrom Death Penalty, FOx31 NEWS (Aug. 10, 2015, 5:10 PM),
https://kdvr.com/news/defense-attomeys-use-colorado-method-to-save-theater-shooter-fromdeath-penalty/ [https://perma.cc/VR5E-HGHG]; Jeffrey Toobin, The Mitigator,NEW YORKER,
May 9, 2011, at 38, https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2011/05/09/the-mitigator ("The
Colorado Method is another important factor in the decline of the death penalty nationwide.");
Matthew Rubenstein, Overview of'the ColoradoMethod of Capital Voir Dire, THE CHAMPION

(Nov. 2010).
8.
Capital Training, OFF. COLO. ST. PUB. DEFS., https://www.coloradodefenders.us/
training/capital-training/ [https://penna.cc/2VQ6-ELGL].
9.
Alex Kotlowitz, In the Face of Death, N.Y. TIMES (July 6, 2003), https://www.
nytimes.com/2003/07/06/magazine/in-the-face-of-death.htnl.

10.
11.

Id.
See id.
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In Part III, I explain some of the issues with the Colorado Method.
One issue is that the method is not fully public. Many capital defense
attorneys do not know about it, nor can they afford to learn it.
Additionally, prosecutors and even the court might focus the jury
selection inquiry on whether jurors could impose the death penalty. If
defense attorneys similarly focus their inquiry on the penalty question,
they contribute to predisposing jurors not only to vote guilty but to
impose a death sentence. Finally, jurors' views, and their eventual
votes, are simply more complicated and not necessarily caused by their
views on the death penalty in the abstract.
Defense attorneys trying capital cases must familiarize
themselves with the research explaining why jurors vote for life or for
death. In Part IV, I highlight the factors researchers have found
significantly influence jurors' decisions, such as the heinousness of the
crime, or a defendant's willingness to express remorse. In Part V, I
propose that defense attorneys question, listen to, and rank jurors on
these topics, instead of narrowly focusing on a juror's philosophical
position on the death penalty. I do not argue that attorneys abandon the
Colorado Method entirely. For some, it may remain a simple and yet
powerful tool. Instead, I argue that lawyers should insist on getting to
know jurors better, especially on the topics we have found carry great
weight for them when they make their decisions.
While no jury selection technique is perfect, and defense attorney
rankings are bound to be statistically imperfect and flawed, the more
expansive method I propose is research-driven and avoids some of the
concerns associated with the Colorado Method. These factors matter to
jurors, so they should matter to the attorneys charged with saving their
clients' lives.
II.

THE COLORADO METHOD

David Wymore, a Colorado attorney, developed the method when
he was actively litigating capital cases. 2 Wymore thought other public
defenders focused too much on litigating the death penalty's
constitutionality instead of persuading jurors to impose a life sentence

12.

Brief of the Nat'l Ass'n of Crim. Defense Laws., et al. as Amici Curiae in Support

of Petitioner at 75a, McWilliams v. Dunn, 137 S. Ct. 1790 (2017) (No. 16-5294).
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then and there.' 3 He felt he had "to learn who kills and why they kill"
and then address their concerns.' 4
Wymore's strategy focused first on isolating and insulating jurors,
helping life-prone jurors realize that they could "make their own moral
assessment-not capitulate that over to somebody else."" Second,
because pro-death jurors often "employ coercive tactics and bullying,"
he reminded all jurors to respect "the opinions of life-giving holdouts,"
and "not browbeat them" to impose death.' 6 As he would tell jurors, no
one can perfectly know from their life experience "who ought to live
and who ought to die," so they should not be able to tell someone else
that their perspective "is wrong."1 7 Wymore used voir dire to remind
jurors that the law presumes a life sentence and that a death sentence is
"a hard, darned thing to get," even for someone who "[d]id it, wanted
to do it ... [,and] would do it again!""
Using Wymore's method, a juror's "attitude toward the death
penalty trumps every other factor usually associated with jury
selection-race, ethnicity, occupation, education."" Attorneys select
jurors "based on their life and death views only" and rank them on a
scale from "one" to "seven," with a "one" being a person who would
never vote for death and a "seven" being a person who would always
vote for it.2 0 A "three" or "four" might be someone who believes in the
death penalty, but may not be able to articulate why.2' One public
defender, Terri Brake, called Wymore's scale "an act of brilliance,"
because after interviewing hundreds of potential jurors, all attorneys
can compare their notes with a simple and consistent number metric. 2
Attorneys using the Colorado Method pose questions that
facilitate "candor and honesty" among jurors, making sure to clarify
13.

Roger Parloff, Too Effective, 19 AM. LAW., Mar. 1997, at 91.

14.

Id.

15.
Id.; Rubenstein, supra note 7.
Parloff, supra note 13, at 91; Rubenstein, supra note 7, at 18-19, 23-24.
16.
17.
Parloff, supra note 13, at 91; Rubenstein, supra note 7, at 24-27.
18.
Parloff, supra note 13, at 92.
19.
Toobin, supra note 7, at 38.
20.
Rubenstein, supra note 7, at 18; Parloff, supra note 13, at 93. Rubenstein defines
the juror rating which I have included as an Appendix. Some scholars have referenced a "threecategory death-penalty-opinion framework" that includes those who will always vote for death,
those who would never vote for death, and those who are undecided. John H. Blume et al.,
Probing "Life Qualification" Through Expanded Voir Dire, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1209, 1234

(2001),
21.
22.

Parloff, supra note 13, at 93.
Id.
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for jurors that "there are no 'right' or 'wrong' answers."2 They use a
combination of jury questionnaires and open-ended, conversational,
"strip," and leading questions, and carefully listen to jurors in order to
discover their views on the death penalty; from there, they assign a
number to each juror.24 For example, Wymore indicated he might
question a juror on a serial killer case about how many people it would
take for the person to give a death sentence.2 5 If the juror gave a number,
say two people, Wymore would try to get the juror to say that they
would not listen to mitigation evidence if the defendant killed two
people, which would support a challenge for cause. If the juror said
they would consider evidence that mitigated a death sentence but
would want to wait to hear from the defense, Wymore might still
challenge the juror as a burden shifter.27
From 1976 to 2004, Wymore litigated approximately eighty
capital cases, none of which resulted in a death sentence, a clearly
astonishing result.28 Wymore's success made him a sought-after
trainer.29 His strategy found criticism from prosecutors and others who
felt Wymore indoctrinated jurors "to thwart the collective decisionmaking process."30 Colorado Attorney General Gale Norton believed
Wymore simply intimidated jurors by convincing them that "every
juror was putting the defendant to death."" Wymore had no problem
with these assertions. He said he "personalize[d] the kill question," by
telling jurors they "have the power to not kill my guy."32 He
querulously wondered how it amounted to intimidation to tell jurors
they have the power to give life, and that the court, the prosecutor, and
other jurors were required to respect each juror's personal and common
33
sense moral judgment: "Now how in the hell is that intimidating?"

23.
24.

Rubenstein, supra note 7, at 20.
Id. at 18, 20-23; Blume et al., supra note 20, at 1248; Janae M. Lepir,

pothetically Speaking: The ConstitutionalParametersof/Capital Voir Dire in the Military
After Morgan v. Illinois, 225 MILWAUKEE L. REV. 375 (2017).
25.

Parloff, supra note 13, at 92-93.

26.
27.

Id.
Id. at 93.

28.

Brief of the National Ass'n of Criminal Defense Lawyers, supra note 12, at 24

29.

Parloff, supra note 13, at 90-92.

30.
31.
32.
33.

Id. at 92.

n.15.

Id.
Id.
Id.
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III. ISSUES WITH THE COLORADO METHOD AND A PROPOSAL FOR
EXPANSION

A capital case is often won or lost in voir dire.34 Even though the
capital defense bar has developed specialized methods like the
Colorado Method to address these concerns, defense attorneys have
often proven to be ineffective at doing voir dire right.35 The Colorado
Method does a lot of things well: it is simple, and as Wymore has
shown, demonstrably effective in many situations. However, there are
some issues with the method that deserve expansion.
A.

The Method Is Not Fully Public

The Colorado Method is proprietary.36 To learn it, ninety
participants must attend a two and a half day seminar at the National
College of Capital Voir Dire in Boulder, Colorado and pay tuition of

Blume et al., supra note 20, at 1209 ("[M]ost trials are won or lost in jury
34.
selection."); id. at 1264 ("Voir dire is short and then you die."); Chris F. Denove & Edward J.
lmwinkelried, Commentaries, Juy Selection: An Empirical Investigation of Demographic
Bias, 19 AM. J. TRIAL ADVoC. 285, 285 (1995) ("[J]ury selection can be the most important
phase of a trial. Pick the right jury, and the battle is half won. But select the wrong jury, and
the case is lost before evidence is even heard."); Harvey Weitz, Voir Dire in Conservative
Times, 22 LITIG. 15, 15 (1996) ("Voir dire is the most important, yet least understood portion
of a jury trial."); Herald Price Fahringer, "Mirror, Mirroron the Wall ... ": Body Language
Intuition, and the Art ofJury Selection, 17 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 197, 197 (1993) (noting that,
according to experts, 85% of the cases "are won or lost when the jury is selected," requiring
counsel to approach voir dire with care); Jeffrey R. Boyll, Psychological, Cognitive,
Personalityand InterpersonalFactorsin Juy Verdicts, 15 L. & PSYCH. REv. 163, 176 (1991)

&

("[J]ury selection is one of the most vital components of the trial proceedings. The case may
be [won] or lost at voir dire."); Margaret Covington, Jury Selection: Innovative Approaches to
Both Civil and CriminalLitigation, 16 ST. MARY'S L.J. 575,575-76 (1984) ("Experienced trial
lawyers agree that the jury selection process is the single most important aspect of the trial
proceedings. In fact, once the last person on the jury is seated, the trial is essentially won or
lost."); Leslie Snyder, Attorney Conducted Voir Dire in a Criminal Case, in JURY TECH. TRIAL
LAw. 246 (Handbook Series, volume 274, 1984) ("Voir Dire is one of the most critical phases
of the trial: all can be lost [if not necessarily won] at this point.").
35.
Blume et al., supra note 20, at 1211; id. at 1239, 1243 (explaining that judges
restrict the necessary exploration and "many defense lawyers are not very adept in the precise,
yet fluid, inquiry that is required"); id. at 1248-64 (describing best practices for voir dire);
Rubenstein, supra note 7, at 18; Lepir, supra note 24, at 395; Neal Bush, The Casefor
Expansive Voir Dire, 2 L. & PSYCH. REV. 9, 9 (1976); see Ronald C. Dillehay & Marla R.
Sandys, Life Under Wainwright v. Witt: JurorDispositionsand Death Qualification, 20 L.
HUM. BEHAV. 147,149 (1996).
36.
Lepir, supra note 24, at 397.
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$500.31 Out of concerns for prosecutorial steps to counter the
methodology, it can be difficult to access the materials. 38 Consequently,
"public information" about the Colorado Method "is limited." 39 The
National College of Capital Voir Dire is a nonprofit; its trainers
volunteer their time, and the organization tries to make the program as
widely available to defense attorneys as possible, even at no or limited
cost. Despite these laudatory attempts to make resources available,
many capital defenders have miniscule budgets and they often lack
basic training or even knowledge of the Colorado Method.4 4
We know that convincing jurors to give life is "a very specialized,
complex undertaking," but as Danalynn Recer, the executive director
of the Gulf Region Advocacy Center told the New Yorker, it "is not
some unknowable thing. This is not curing cancer. We know how to do
this. It is possible to persuade a jury to value someone's life." 4
Importantly, we have valuable, publicly available research explaining
how and why capital jurors exercise particular votes. Capital defense
attorneys need to be aware of it and effectively use it.
I do not undervalue or want to negate the experiential training
defense attorneys receive at the National College's training. I would
commend it to any capital defense lawyer. But given that too few
attorneys attend these conferences because of the lack of time, money,
or other resources, the defense community needs at a minimum an
awareness of this body of research. Additionally, the research findings
in this Article justify expanding the method or altering aspects of it by
asking jurors about subjects beyond the life and death question.

37.

National Capital Voir Dire Training Program, NAT'L COLL. CAP. VOIR DIRE,

https://www.nccvd.org [https://penna.cc/U24E-LPQZ].

38. See Application for May Boulder Program, NAT'L COLL. CAP. VOiR DIRE,
https://www.nccvd.org/application [https://perma.cc/WJP3-BMGX] (last visited Nov. 18,
2021).
39.
Lepir, supra note 24, at 397 (calling Rubenstein's Article "the most in-depth,
publicly available discussion of the methodology"); Rubenstein, supra note 7.

40.

Laura Dara Sudeall, Note, Effectively Ineffective: The Failureof Courtsto Address

UnderfundedIndigent Defense Systems, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1731-32 (2005). According
to the Colorado Independent, "indignation and rage power [Wymore's] work," and in
retirement he teaches younger lawyers the Colorado Method, which "[h]e plans to continue,"
even if Colorado were to abandon the death penalty. Susan Greene, Inside the Small Legal

Community Defending Colorado Death Penalty Clients, a Wary Hope for Appeal, COLO.
INDEP. (Feb. 21, 2020), https://www.coloradoindependent.com/2020/02/21/death-penaltyabolition-capital-defenses/ [https://perma.cc/QZ8T-Z3AH].
Toobin, supra note 7, at 32, 34.
41.
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DiscussingPunishmentPriorto Trial PredisposesJurorsto
Findthe Defendant Guilty and to Impose a Death Sentence

The Colorado Method prioritizes "jurors' perspective on the death
penalty ... over any other consideration." 42 This runs the risk of
devastating an innocence case. When jurors are questioned about
punishment prior to trial, they are more likely not only to convict but
also to sentence the defendant to death. 43 While the method's
proponents suggest admonishing jurors not to hold questions of
punishment against a defendant, 44 the research has shown this strategy
is not very effective." It mistakenly assumes that jurors' openly
expressed commitments ("I won't consider that evidence") are more
significant than their deeply held and often unconscious biases.4 6 As
Judge Learned Hand wrote, similar instructions ask for "a mental
gymnastic" that jurors simply cannot make. It amounts to a "judicial
42.
43.

Parloff, supra note 13, at 93.
Rubenstein, supra note 7, at 20; John H. Blume et al., Future Dangerousness in
CapitalCases: Always "at Issue," 86 CORNELLL. REV. 397, 404 (2001); William J. Bowers

& Wanda D. Foglia, Still Singularly Agonizing: Law s Failureto Purge Arbitrarinessfrom
CapitalSentencing, 39 CRIM. L. BULL. 51, 65 (2003) ("The CJP indicates further that the jury
qualification process itself creates a bias toward death."). Some jurors interpret the judge's
instructions to "follow the law" as a comment that the law requires a death sentence. Blume et

al., supra note 20, at 1231, 1238, 1238 n.100. They think, "[o]h, I get it. They're asking me if
I can kill this guy. Yeah, I'll do that if that's what I'm supposed to do." Id. at 1231.
44.
Rubenstein, supra note 7, at 20.
45.
Adam Trahan, In Their Own Words: Capital Jurors' Reactions to Mitigation
Strategies, 7 INT'L J. PUNISHMENT & SENT'G 1, 2 (2011); Brooke Butler, The Role of Death

Qualification in Jurors'Susceptibility to PretrialPublicity, 37 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCH. 115,
115 (2007) (explaining that death-qualified juries were more likely to "think that the defendant
was guilty, and recommend the death penalty"): id. at 121 (arguing death qualification is
constitutionally suspect); Blume et al., supra note 20, at 1231-32; Claudia L. Cowan et al., The

Effects of Death Qualificationon Jurors' Predisposition to Convict and on the Quality of
Deliberation,8 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 53, 55-75 (1984); Craig Haney, On the Selection of Capital

Juries: The Biasing Effects of the Death-QualificationProcess, 8 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 121, 12122, 128-32 (1984) [hereinafter Haney, On the Selection of Capital Juries]; Craig Haney,
Examining Death Qualification:FurtherAnalysis of the ProcessEffect, 8 L. & HuM. BEHAV.
133, 133-34, 137 (1984); see Craig Haney et al., "Modern " Death Qualification:New Data
on its Biasing Eflects, 18 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 619, 627-28, 631 (1994).
46. People v. Williams, 628 P.2d 869, 873 (Cal. 1981) (quoting Jay M. Spears, Note,
Voir Dire: Establishing Minimum Standards to Facilitate the Exercise of Peremptory
Challenges, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1493, 1495 (1975)); see also Blume et al., supra note 20, at
1236-37 (noting the importance of the distinction between conscious and unconscious biases).

47. Nash v. United States, 54 F.2d 1006, 1007 (2d Cir. 1932); United States v. Delli
Paoli, 229 F.2d 319, 321 (2d Cir. 1956), aff'd, 352 U.S. 232 (1957); United States v.
Grunewald, 233 F.2d 556, 573-74 (2d Cir. 1956) (Frank, J., dissenting), rev'd, 353 U.S. 391
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lie" and promotes the "unmitigated fiction" that jurors can merely put
punishment "out of their minds" once they have been extensively
questioned about it.45
One Colorado Method proponent advocates front-loading a
vigorous defense theory so life-prone jurors can concede guilt in trade
for "extract[ing]" a life sentence concession from death-prone jurors.49
While this might be an effective strategy for a guilty defendant, which
is often the case, this does not work for the innocent. The number of
capital cases involving innocent defendants is somewhat opaque, but
one study observed that 15% of death-sentenced cases involved a
subsequent exoneration.50 This is not an insignificant number. Lawyers
should not define "victory" as a life sentence for an innocent-or
potentially innocent-defendant. That defendant wants an acquittal. If
that defendant's lawyers focus jury selection entirely on the penalty
question, they unintendedly, even if partially, can cause the jury to
think, that defendant must be guilty if their lawyers are asking if we
could sentence them to life. It sounds like their lawyers are not even
questioning that they did it.
While there are stronger proposals to remedy these problems,
such as providing a separate jury for each phase of the capital trial,5
lawyers should nonetheless carefully limit overt discussions about the
death penalty. As I propose, they can question jurors about issues that
outwardly seem unrelated to punishment, but demonstrably affect
jurors' verdicts, such as the viciousness of a murder or a juror's life
experience. That way, in a more indirect manner, lawyers can still
discover the juror's views that would have an impact on their vote for
life or for death and still maintain some distance, especially in the
innocence case, from the govemment's emphasis on death.

(1957); see also Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 132 n.8 (1968) (emphasizing Judge
Hand's statement in Nash).

48.

Grunewald, 233 F.2d at 574; Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453,

(1949) (Jackson, J., concurring); Delli Paoli v. United States, 352 U.S. 232, 248 (1957)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
Rubenstein, supra note 7, at 20.
49.

50. Karcin Vick et al., Lethal Leverage: False Confessions, FalsePleas, and Wrongfud
Homicide Convictions in Death-eligibleCases, 24 CONTEMP. JUST. REv. 24, 26 (2021).
51.
Robert L. Spangenberg & Elizabeth R. Walsh, Capital Punishment or Li/e
Imprisonment? Some Cost Considerations,23 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 45, 52 (1989).
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JurorsDo Not Always Vote Consistent with Their Views on the
Death Penalty

Finally, jurors' sentencing votes do not always coincide with their
positions on the death penalty.5 2 While this undoubtedly is a substantial
factor, it is unclear if it is statistically significant. I have not found a
study experimentally validating the Colorado Method. However, the
research has some contrary findings. One study found that 24% of
apparent death penalty supporters "were actually opponents" and 42%
of predicted opponents "were in fact proponents." 53 Among jurors, it is
more common to find a pro-death person "in opponent's clothing" than
the other way around.54 By solely focusing on the life and death
question, defense lawyers risk misidentifying these jurors, who
outwardly appear to hold a position they may not actually conform to
when they exercise their vote. A broader inquiry can help discover and
identify these jurors.
D.

Expandingthe ColoradoMethod

The concerns above do not invalidate the Colorado Methodthey illustrate why I believe the research findings this Article will lay
out are particularly important to consider when one goes to select a
capital jury.
As I have experienced in my own capital litigation, and as many
of my fellow capital defense attorneys have explained to me, courts
will not allow them to conduct the expansive voir dire that I propose
here. I recognize that my proposal may work well in theory, but would
be difficult, if not sometimes impossible, to implement in practice. That
does not mean that attorneys should not try to expand their questioning
during voir dire. They can point the court to this research and advocate
for more options.
That said, many attorneys are not comfortable with the complex
inquiry I propose here. For them, the Colorado Method remains simple,
achievable, workable, and successful and they see no need to deviate.
That is not an untenable position.

52.

James Alan Fox et at., Death Penalty Opinion in the Post-Furman Years

Challengingthe Death Penalty, 18 N.Y.U. REv. L. & SOC. CHANGE 499, 508 (1990).
53. Id.
54. Id.
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Nonetheless, we cannot escape the reality that "the unbiased juror
does not exist."" Since jurors, like all people, relate to the world
through the experiences and preconceptions they have accumulated
over a lifetime,56 I believe it is more beneficial to broadly question
jurors, to get to know them better, and to select "the most favorably
biased jury" one can find. 57 As one lawyer who read an early draft of
this Article told me, he remained committed to the Colorado Method,
but found that the evidence-based information detailed here led him to
ask additional questions during voir dire at his next trial. That is entirely
my intent. Once defense lawyers start asking jurors about researchdriven subjects, not only will they have broader and more rounded
pictures of jurors, but they will better understand their likelihood to
vote for life or for death.
IV.

FINDINGS FROM THE CAPITAL JURY PROJECT AND

OTHER

RESEARCH

Defense attorneys can know what affects jurors' votes. The
Capital Jury Project (CJP) was a National Science Foundation-funded
study in which 1,198 former capital jurors, who collectively served on
353 capital trials, took a fifty-one-page survey and were interviewed
for approximately three to four hours each. 58 "It represents a landmark
research initiative and one of the most comprehensive and systematic
efforts ever made to study death-penalty decision making by juries."59
The CJP helps us understand capital jurors' decision making.
While jurors are constitutionally required to objectively restrict the
death penalty to the most heinous of murders and murderers, weighing
both aggravating and mitigating circumstances of the offense and of

Victor Gold, Covert Advocacy: Reflections on the Use of Psychological
55.
Persuasion Techniques in the Courtroom,65 N.C. L. REV. 481, 492 (1987).
56.
57.

Id.
Id.

58.
Adam Trahan, Identifving Factors that Shape Capital Jurors' Impressions of
Attorneys, 32 JUST. SYS. J. 169, 172 (2011); Lepir, supra note 24, at 394; Eric R. Carpenter, An
Overview of the CapitalJury Projectfor MilitaryJustice Practitioners:Jury Dynamics, Juror
Confusion, and JurorResponsibility, 2011 ARMY LAW. 6, 7 (2011); William J. Bowers, The
CapitalJurv: Is It Tilted Toward Death?, 79 JUDICATURE 220, 220 (1996).
Dennis J. Devine & Christopher E. Kelly, Life or Death: An Examinationof Jury
59.
Sentencing with the CapitalJuy Project Database, 21 PSYCH. PUB. POL'Y & L. 393, 393

(2015).
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the offender," the reality is that capital juror sentencing is more like
falling in love, as Scott Sundby has explained.6 1 Clive Stafford Smith
put it a little differently: to vote for life, "the jury has to feel both
sympathy and empathy" for the defendant. 62
These are admittedly loose determinations. However, the research
has shown "distinctive patterns," or what I call factors, that can
influence jurors' decisions.6 3 The first factors involve the case and the
defendant, which I explain in Part IV.A. Other factors relate to a juror's
unique personal characteristics, which I cover in Part IV.B. I style these
factors as questions attorneys ask about their case or their juror.
Attorneys would then numerically rank each juror on each factor using
the Colorado Method's one to seven scale. Once they have this broad
picture of the juror in hand, defense attorneys can then assign the juror
an overall ranking, which they can use to select a jury more
sympathetic to the defendant, to a not guilty verdict, and to a life
sentence.
Effective lawyering is key. The CJP findings demonstrate that if
jurors feel emotional distance from the defendant, they will vote for
death.` The line between a life or a death verdict is "razor-thin," and
juries vote for life only when attorneys present their client's story in a
compelling and sympathetic way.65 Through the more expansive
process this Article proposes, defense counsel can better discover and
remove unsympathetic jurors and also support and select jurors who
are more likely to connect with their clients, empathize with them, and
spare them their lives.

60. Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 971-75 (1994); Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S.
463, 474 (1993); Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 244 (1988); Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S.
862, 877 (1983); id. at 879 (outlining that there must be "an individualized determination on
the basis of the character of the individual and the circumstances of the crime."); Lockett v.
Ohio, 438 U.S. 586,604 (1978) (noting that an individualized sentence requires "consideration
of the 'character and record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the particular

offense"') (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976)).
61.
ScoTT E. SUNDBY, A LIFE AND DEATH DECISION: A JURY WEIGHS
PENALTY 134 (2005).

THE DEATH

62.
63.
64.

Toobin, supra note 7, at 36.
SUNDBY, supra note 61, at 134-35.
See Craig Haney, Taking CapitalJurorsSeriously, 70 IND. L. J. 1223, 1224 (1995).

65.

SUNDBY, supra note 61, at 137.
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Lawyers Must Query JurorsAbout Case-Specific Issues that

Influence Their Verdict
Several case-specific factors can influence a juror's sentence.
Some factors, such as a defendant's willingness to express remorse,
may exist in every case, but other factors, like the number of victims,
may not be at issue. Some factors may be highly important in one case,
less important in another, and not important at all in some. But if they
exist, jurors find they affect their decision.
1.

Did the Defendant Kill More Than One Person or Commit the
Crime in a Particularly Heinous or Cruel Manner?

As one capital juror explained, "there was no way" they could find
that the victim provoked an attack because the "heinousness of the
crime was so great." 66 This played a significant role in the jury's
sentencing decision. Another capital juror said that no evidence would
have led jurors to sympathize with the defendant "because the crime
itself was so awful." 7
The more seriously violent the offense, the more likely a death
sentence, especially if the victim was tortured or suffered before
death.6 8 In one Florida study, 64% of death-voting jurors indicated the
manner of death was the basis for their vote.69 If jurors perceive the

66.

Sally Costanzo & Mark Costanzo, Life orDeath Decisions:An Analysis of Capital

JuryDecision Making Under the SpecialIssues Sentencing Framework, 18 L. & HuM. BEHAV.

151, 161 (1994).
67. Id.
&

Theodore Eisenberg et al., ForecastingLife and Death:JurorRace. Religion, and
68.
Attitude Toward the Death Penalty, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 277, 278 (2001); John M. Scheb II
Kristin A. Wagers, Racial Discrimination in the Death Penalty in Tennessee: An Empirical
Assessment, 5 TENN. J.L. & POL'Y 9, 17 (2008); John H. Blume et al., Lessons from the Capital
JuryProject, in BEYOND REPAIR? AMERICA'S DEATH PENALTY 163-65 (Stephen P. Garvey ed.,

&

2003); Michael E. Antonio, Arbitrariness and the Death Penalty: How the Defendant's
Appearance During TrialInfluences CapitalJurors'PunishmentDecision, 24 BEHAV. Sci.
L. 215, 224-26 (2006); Blume et al., supra note 20, at 1224; Stephen P. Garvey, Aggravation
and Mitigation in Capital Cases: What Do Jurors Think?, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1538, 1539

(1998); Mark Costanzo & Sally Costanzo, Jury DecisionMaking in the CapitalPenaltyPhase:
Legal Assumptions, EmpiricalFindings, and a Research Agenda, 16 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 185,
188-89 (1992). One Tennessee study found that homicides committed for sexual pleasure or
to silence a witness, or by methods such as drowning, throat slashing, strangulation or
suffocation were more likely to result in death sentences over homicides committed because
ofjealousy, hatred, or racial or religious motivations. Scheb II & Wagers, supra, at 19, 21.
William S. Geimer & Jonathan Amsterdam, Why Jurors Vote Life Or Death:
69.

OperativeFactorsin Ten FloridaDeath Penalty Cases, 15 AM. J. GRIM. L. 1, 47 (1988).
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homicide as heinous, they are much less likely to consider evidence in
mitigation and even will think that they must vote for death.70
A defendant who kills more than one person is much more likely
to be sentenced to death, as much as three times more likely.7 1 One
multivariate logistic regression analysis of 918 jurors from 244 trials
found that of five significant predictors of a death sentence, the most
significant was the number of victims killed." A different multivariate
analysis of CJP data found that "each additional victim killed increased
the likelihood of a death sentence by 78%."73
Capital defense attorneys must especially avoid downplaying a
heinous offense, such as comparing a multiple homicide to a mass
murder or torture, which greatly offends jurors. 74 In one case, jurors felt
a defense attorney "blew his case" with this tactic.75
2.

Does the Defendant Have a Lengthy History of Violence,
Particularly a Prior Murder?

One CJP multivariate regression analysis concluded that "[t]he
individual aggravator most strongly related to" a death sentence was
the defendant's history of violence. 76 Defendants with long criminal
histories, especially violent crime or three or more felonies, are much
more likely to receive a death sentence.7 7 A survey of capital jurors in
70. Thomas W. Brewer, Race and Jurors'Receptivity to Mitigation in CapitalCases:
The Effect ofJurors', Deferudants', and Victims' Race in Combination, 28 L. & HUM. BEHAV.
529, 539 (2004); Blune et al., supra note 68, at 160 (finding that 41% of capital jurors believed
they must impose a death sentence if the crime was heinous, vile, or depraved); Garvey, supra
note 68, at 1542; Theodore Eisenberg et al., Jury Responsibility in Capital Sentencing: An
Empirical Study, 44 BUFF. L. REV. 339, 360 (1996); William J. Bowers, The CapitalJury

Project: Rationale, Design, and Preview of Early Findings, 70 IND. L.J. 1043, 1091 n.32
(1995); Geimer & Amsterdam, supra note 69, at 41.
71.
Nadine M. Connell, Death by Jury: Group Dynamics and Capital Sentencing in
CRIMINAL JUSTICE: RECENT SCHOLARSHIP 167 (Marilyn McShane & Frank P. Williams III eds.,
1st ed. 2009); Scheb 11 & Wagers, supra note 68, at 23; Jonathan R. Sorensen & James W.
Marquart, ProsecutorialandJuy Decision-Makingin Post-Furman Texas CapitalCases, 18
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 743, 764 (1990).
Connell, supra note 71; Devine & Kelly, supra note 59, at 395.
72.
73.
Devine & Kelly, supra note 59, at 401.
Trahan, supra note 45, at 5-6.
74.

75.

Id. at 6.

76.
Devine & Kelly, supra note 59, at 399.
77.
Sorensen & Marquart, supra note 71, at 771; Scheb II & Wagers, supra note 68, at
24. See also Sorensen & Marquart, supra note 71, at 771 (noting that offenders with arrest or
prison records of violent offenses are more likely to receive death sentences); id. at 774 ("A
prior conviction increased an offender's odds of receiving a death sentence by 7.7%.").
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eleven states found that 70% believed that death was the only
acceptable punishment if the person had previously committed another
murder. 78
3.

Does the Defendant Pose a Risk of Future Violence, Especially
of Committing Another Murder?

"Jurorsmainly kill out of fear" that the defendant is "going to get
loose and kill somebody, or ... kill somebody else in prison."" The
CJP findings confirm this.80 Virtually every social science researcher
has "been struck" with jurors' "tendency to recast their sentencing
decision" as a need to protect society from a future act of violence." It
is often the reason jurors impose the death penalty.82 Jurors often latch
onto this belief early in the trial and it becomes "extremely difficult to

78.
Blume et al., supra note 68, at 151-52; Blume et al., supra note 20, at 1224.
Parloff, supra note 13, at 93.
79.
Bowers, supra note 58, at 221-22; Devine & Kelly, supra note 59, at 395;
80.
Theodore Eisenberg & Martin T. Wells, Deadly Confusion: Juror Instructions in Capital
Cases, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 7-8 (1993); James Luginbuh] & Julie Howe, Discretion in

Capital Sentencing Instructions: Guided or Misguided?, 70 IND. L.J. 1161, 1177 (1995);
Eisenberg et al., supra note 68, at 302 n.87; Stephen P. Garvey, The Emotional Economy of
Capital Sentencing, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 26, 67 (2000); Blume et al., supra note 68, at 165-67.
At least one study has found that jurors' fears of future dangerousness had only marginal
significance in their decision to give the death penalty. Devine & Kelly, supra note 59, at 403.
Haney, supra note 64, at 1231; Garvey, supra note 68, at 1542. Future
81.
dangerousness is "at issue" in "virtually all capital trials." Blume et al., supra note 43, at 398-

99.
82.

William W. Berry

111, Ending Death by Dangerousness: A Path to the De Facto

Abolition of the Death Penalty, 52 ARIz. L. REV. 889, 893 (2010) (finding that future
dangerousness is "the strongest determinant" of a death sentence); Erica Beecher-Monas, The
Epistemology of Prediction:Future Dangerousness Testimony and Intellectual Due Process,
60 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 353, 412 (2003) (explaining that it is the "majormeans" of persuading
jurors to vote for death); Elizabeth S. Vartkessian, Dangerously Biased: How the Texas Capital
Sentencing Statute Encourages Jurors to Be Unreceptive to Mitigation Evidence, 29
QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 237, 280 (2011) (noting that jurors believe future dangerousness mandates
a death sentence); Garvey, supra note 68, at 1539; Blume et al., supra note 43, at 404 (finding
that future dangerousness is "second only to the crime itself' in importance to capital jurors);
Costanzo & Costanzo, supra note 66, at 160 (finding "that nearly all jurors" have said their
"penalty decision hinged on" whether defendant would be a continual threat); Mark D.
Cunningham et al., Capital Jury Decision-Making: The Limitations of Predictions of Future
Violence, 15 PSYCH. PUB. POL'Y & L. 223, 225 (2009) (explaining that jurors found future
dangerousness in all 436 Texas executions, 65 of Oklahoma's 89, and 74 of Virginia's 103);
see also Eisenberg & Wells, supra note 80, at 7 (showing that over three-fourths of capital
jurors believe the defendant will be a future danger).
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displace" even with a compelling case in mitigation.83 Upwards of
three-quarters of CJP jurors indicate it was the major factor that they
discussed and that affected their decision. 84
Even the best experts find they cannot accurately predict future
dangerousness.8 5 Jurors do much worse, grossly overestimating a

&

83.
SUNDY, supra note 61, at 145; Vartkessian, supra note 82, at 271-72, 281 (citing
Blume et al, supra note 43, at 398-99); Wanda D. Foglia, Research Note, They Know Not
What They Do: Unguided and MisguidedDiscretionin Pennsylvania CapitalCases, 20 JUST.
Q. 187, 206 (2003) (noting that future dangerousness was an "overriding consideration" that
concerned "most jurors" throughout the trial and deliberations).
84.
Foglia, supra note 83, at 197; Vartkessian, supra note 82, at 281; Blume et al.,
supra note 43, at 404; Stephen P. Garvey & Paul Marcus, Virginia's CapitalJurors,44 WM.
& MARY L. REv. 2063, 2089-91 (2003); Berry UtI, supra note 82, at 901.
85.
Carla Edmondson, Nothing Is Certain but Death: Why Future Dangerousness
Mandates Abolition of the Death Penalty, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 857, 861-62 (2016);
Mark D. Cunningham et al., Assertions of "Future Dangerousness" at Federal Capital
Sentencing: Rates and Correlates of Subsequent Prison Misconduct and Violence, 32 L.
HUM. BEHAV. 46, 61 (2008); Mitzi Dorland & Daniel Krauss, The Danger of Dangerousness

in Capital Sentencing: Exacerbating the Problem of Arbitrary and Capricious DecisionMaking, 29 L. & PsYcH. REV. 63, 85-86 (2005); Berry III, supra note 82, at 907 (noting that
the research findings "demonstrate the extreme inaccuracy in predicting future
dangerousness"); Daniel A. Krauss & Bruce D. Sales, The Effects of Clinical and Scientific
Expert Testimony on JurorDecision Making in CapitalSentencing, 7 PSYCH. PUB. PoL'Y & L.
267, 280-81 (2001); Meghan Shapiro, An Overdose of Dangerousness: How "Future
Dangerousness" Catches the Least Culpable Capital Defendants and Undermines the
Rationale for the Executions It Supports, 35 AM. J. CRIM. L. 145, 161-62 (2008) ("Mental
health professionals themselves are entirely skeptical of their own predictions, academics
appear to have unanimously accepted that such professionals are unreliable, and studies of
capital jurors show a high misperception of general risks of violence.") (footnotes omitted);
see also Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 355 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring) ("[M]urderers
are extremely unlikely to commit other crimes either in prison or upon their release. For the
most part, they are first offenders, and when released from prison they are known to become
model citizens."); Brief Amicus Curiae for the American Psychiatric Ass'n for Petitioner at 9,
Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983) (No. 82-6080) (finding that experts are wrong two out
of three times); see also id. at 8-9 ("[M]edical knowledge has simply not advanced to the point
where long-term predictions .. . may be made with even reasonable accuracy."). As Justice
Marshall explained, the Supreme Court has "not decide[d] the substantive question of whether
a prediction of future dangerousness is a proper criterion for determining whether a defendant

is to live or die." California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1023 n.9 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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defendant's likelihood of future violence,86 when convicted murders
actually have low recidivism rates.8 7
Jurors similarly will sentence someone to death if they think there
is a possibility that the defendant will get out of prison.8 An Oregon
juror explained that the jury felt that the defendant was "going to get
out if you give him life imprisonment" and that "[t]he only way I can
guarantee that" he will not get out is to impose a death sentence. 9

Thomas J. Reidy et al., Probabilityof CriminalActs of Violence: A Test of Jury
86.
PredictiveAccuracv, 31 BEHAV. ScI. & L. 286, 297 (2013); Jonathan R. Sorensen & Rocky L.

Pilgrim, An ActuarialRisk Assessment of Violence Posed by CapitalMurderDefendants, 90
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1251, 1269 (2000) (noting that jurors "severely overestimate the

&

likelihood of violence being committed by a life-sentenced capital murderer" at 85% for a new
violent crime and 50% for a new homicide, when the actual rate is "approximately 0.2% over
a forty-year term, while the risk of assaultive behavior in general is about 16%"); James W.
Marquart et al., Gazing into the CrystalBall: Can JurorsAccurately PredictDangerousness
in Capital Cases?, 23 L. & SOc'Y REV. 449,463 (1989) (finding that in 85% of Texas capital
cases, "the jury failed to predict that the defendant would pose a continuing threat to society");
id. at 466 ("[J]urors err in the direction of false positives when it comes to predicting future
dangerousness.").
Edmondson, supra note 85, at 906; Cunningham et al., supra note 82, at 227;
87.
Shapiro, supra note 85, at 162; Sorensen & Pilgrim, supra note 86, at 1256 (explaining that
convicted murderers are "among the most docile and trustworthy inmates in the institution");
James W. Marquart & Jonathan R. Sorensen, A National Study of the Furman-Commuted
Inmates: Assessing the Threat to Society from Capital Offenders, 23 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 5, 8,
28 (1989) ("Studies of commuted capital offenders suggest that these inmates are not unusual
threats to institutional order and security"; "these prisoners did not represent a significant threat
to society."); THORSTEN SELLIN, THE PENALTY OF DEATH 120 (1980) (concluding that capital
murderers "whether in prison or on parole, pose no special threat to the safety of their
fellowmen"); Sorensen & Pilgrim, supra note 86, at 1269 (referring to a 0.2% re-offense rate
for a future homicide); Hugo Adam Bedau, Recidivism, Parole, and Deterrence, in BEYOND
REPAIR? AMERICA'S DEATH PENALTY 173, 175-80 (1982) ("[N]o other class of offender has
such a low rate of recidivism.").
SuNDBY, supra note 61, at 147-48; Foglia, supra note 83, at 190-91; Theodore
88.
Eisenberg et al., The Deadly Paradoxof CapitalJurors, 74 S. CAL. L. REv. 371, 373 (2001)
("Where LWOP is the alternative, jurors either do not know about it, or do not believe it really
means the defendant will, in fact, never be released on parole."); William J. Bowers
Benjamin D. Steiner, Death by Default: An EmpiricalDemonstration of False and Forced
Choices in CapitalSentencing, 77 TEX. L. REv. 605,636 (1999) (finding that almost two-thirds
of jurors would vote for life if they knew the defendant would not be paroled); id. at 648
(finding that jurors "grossly underestimate" how long life-sentenced prisoners will stay in
prison); Bowers, supra note 58, at 222; Luginbuhl & Howe, supra note 80, at 1179 (explaining
that jurors' belief that a life-sentenced defendant "would spend relatively little time in prison"
and be released was a "strong motivation" to vote for death).
Costanzo & Costanzo, supra note 66, at 163. Only 12% of Pennsylvania capital
89.
jurors thought a life-sentenced defendant would actually serve a life sentence; the rest
estimated the defendant would serve fifteen to nineteen years. Foglia, supra note 83, at 196.
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Many jurors also wrongly believe that a death-sentenced person
will not get executed. 90 As one capital juror said, "[n]inety-nine percent
of the time they don't put you to death. You sit on death row and get
old." 9' If jurors think the defendant will serve less than twenty years
(and especially less than ten years), they are more likely to vote for
death.92
Jurors feel life sentences are overly lenient,93 that prisoners have
free meals and TVs, and that they do not have to work. David Wymore
responded to these concerns by showing jurors that life "really means
life."94 He has had prison officials testify and he has shown jurors
videos about twenty-three-hour lockdowns, total isolation, and being
"fed through a slot."95 This strategy has often proven successful. 96
4.

Will the Defendant Express Sincere Remorse for the Killing or
Show It Visually?

A defendant's willingness to express remorse-to genuinely say
they are sorry-may be the single greatest factor that will persuade

90.

Austin Sarat, Violence, Representation, and Responsibility in Capital Trials: The

View from the Jury, 70 IND. L.J. 1103, 1131-33 (1995); In one study, three-fourths of jurors
who sentenced someone to death believed the defendant would serve less than twenty years in
prison, while life-sentencing jurors estimated the defendant would twenty to thirty years.
Luginbuhl & Howe, supra note 80, at 1178. Two-thirds of jurors indicated they would have
voted for life had they known the defendant would be incarcerated for the period of time the
law requires. Foglia, supranote 83, at 190. An Oregon capital juror similarly tried to convince
other jurors to vote for death because "[they] know he's not going to get it" and their vote
"doesn't mean that [they're] going to kill him." Costanzo & Costanzo, supra note 66, at 163.
Sarat, supra note 90, at 1133.
91.
Bowers & Steiner, supra note 88, at 664; Bowers, supra note 58, at 222; Eisenberg
92.
& wells, supra note 80, at 7-9; Luginbuhl & Howe, supra note 80, at 1 178 (noting that jurors
who sentenced to death strongly believed life-sentenced defendants served a "relatively short
time in prison"); see SUNDBY, supra note 61, at 147.
See Blume et al., supra note 20, at 1248. In general, jurors often perceive the
93.
criminal justice system as lenient. Benjamin D. Steiner et al., Folk Knowledge as Legal Action:

Death Penalty Judgments and the Tenet of Early Release in a Culture of Mistrust and
Punitiveness,33 L. & Soc'Y REV. 461, 464-66 (1999).
94.
Parloff, supra note 13, at 93; Foglia, supra note 83, at 207; Bowers & Steiner,
supra note 88, at 712-13.
95.
Parloff, supra note 13, at 93.
96. See SUNDBY, supranote 61, at 146. In one case, jurors noticed a prisoner-witness's
"clear dread" when a prosecutor warned a witness he could be sent back to supennax; this
powerfully led jurors to see the seriousness of a life sentence. Id. at 147.

2021 ]

GETTING TO KNOW YOU

15 1

'

jurors to vote for life.97 Conversely, jurors "show little mercy to
defendants who show no remorse."9 8 One multivariate study of thirtynine aggravators and mitigators from the entire CJP database found a
defendant's lack of remorse was the strongest predictor of a juror's vote
for death.9 9
Even if a defendant does not testify, jurors scrutinize them looking
for outward signs of remorse, such as crying, or signs that they lack
remorse, such as wandering stares, boredom, smiling at the wrong
moment, or remaining expressionless.10 They also look for "positive
personality characteristics," which works for the defendant if jurors
think they are attractive.'"'
If the defendant claimed innocence and lost, CJP jurors strongly
resent what they see as expressions of remorse that come too late and,
to them, seem quite insincere.' 0 2 One juror said the defendant was
"[g]rasping at straws" at that point.' Bare pleas for mercy from
defense attorneys rarely resonate with jurors if they have not seen it
from the defendant, which is why some recommend the defendant
personally express regret "as early as possible." 04

Theodore Eisenberg et al., But Was He Sorry? The Role of Remorse in Capital
97.
Sentencing, 83 CORNELL L. REv. 1599, 1633-37 (1998); Devine & Kelly, supra note 59, at
403; Scott E. Sundby, The CapitalJury and Absolution: The Intersection of Trial Strateg',
Remorse, and the Death Penalty, 83 CORNELL L. REv. 1557, 1558, 1560 (1998); Vartkessian,
supra note 82, at 270; Costanzo & Costanzo, supra note 68, at 198 (noting that jurors view
"confession and repentance" as prerequisites for mercy); Garvey, supra note 80, at 58-59.
Garvey, supra note 68, at 1539.
98.
Devine & Kelly, supra note 59, at 395; see also Garvey, supra note 68, at 1538
99.
(finding a lack of remorse to be a significant aggravator). According to another scholar, lack
of remorse is behind only a violent criminal history and future dangerousness. Id. at 1560-61.
100. Geimer & Amsterdam, supra note 69, at 51-52; Sundby, supra note 97, at 1561-65;
Costanzo & Costanzo, supra note 66, at 161; Costanzo & Costanzo, supra note 68, at 198

&

(explaining that jurors take the lack of expression "as a lack of concern and remorse"); Antonio,
supra note 68, at 219, 227-34 (finding that, when jurors believed the defendant appeared
emotionally involved, sony, and sincere, they tended to favor a life sentence, but when the
defendant appeared bored, frightening, or self-confident, "they sought the death penalty
instead"); see Connell, supra note 71, at 167.
101. Connell, supra note 71, at 167; Antonio, supra note 68, at 218-19. Jurors are more
likely to give death to someone they see as a prototypical violent criminal. Costanzo
Costanzo, supra note 68, at 198.
102. Trahan, supra note 45, at 5-6.
103. Id. at 6.
104. Id. at 11. Jurors perceive the defendant's expression of remorse at the end of the
case as a "last-ditch" effort to save their life. Id.
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Would Jurors Empathize and Sympathize with the Victim?

Jurors are more likely to impose a death sentence if they
empathize or identify with the victim, which is especially the case in a
rape-homicide or stranger-homicide case.'0 5 Just hearing testimony
from the victim's family influences jurors to vote for death. '06
Consequently, jurors are less sympathetic to victims who engaged in
high-risk or anti-social activity, like prostitutes or drug dealers. 10 7
6.

Will the Defendant and/or the Victim's Race Introduce Racial
Dynamics into the Trial?

If the defendant is a person of color and especially if the victim is
white, racial dynamics will come into play.1 8 Communities of color
are the criminal justice system's most common targets.1 09 Henry

105. Sorensen & Marquart, supra note 71, at 767; Scott E. Sundby, The CapitalJury
and Empathy: The Problem of Worthy and Unworthy Victims, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 343, 345

(2003).
106. Janice Nadler & Mary R. Rose, Victim Impact Testimony and the Psychology of
Punishment, 88 CoRNELL L. REV. 419,436 (2003); see also Bryan Myers & Edith Greene, The

PrejudicialNature of Victim Impact Statements: Implicationsfor CapitalSentencing Policy,
10 PSYCH. PUB. POL'Y & L. 492, 508 (2004) (highlighting difficulties with using victim impact
evidence).
107. Sundby, supra note 105, at 356; Edith Greene et al., Victim Impact Evidence in

CapitalCases: Does the Victim's CharacterMatter?, 28 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCH. 145, 147-48,
154-55 (1998); see Edith Greene, The Many Guises of Victim Impact Evidence and Effects on

Jurors'Judgments,5 PSYCH. CRIME&L. 331, 345 (1999).
108.

Michael L. Radelet & Glenn L. Pierce, Race and ProsecutorialDiscretion in

Homicide Cases, 19 L. & Soc'Y REV. 587, 618 (1985) (finding that bias regarding "the
defendant's and victim's races are major determinants of who is selected for execution"); id.
at 601 ("[C]ases with white victims are more likely to be upgraded than cases with black
victims ... "); Marvin E. Wolfgang & Marc Riedel, Race, JudicialDiscretion, and the Death
Penalty, 407 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. Sci. 119, 125 (1973) (noting that Black men
were eighteen times more likely to receive a death sentence than white defendants).
109. William Quigley, Racism: The Crime in CriminalJustice, 13 Loy. J. PUB. INT. L.
417, 417 (2012); lan F. Haney L6pez, Post-RacialRacism: Racial Stratification and Mass
Incarcerationin the Age ofObama, 98 CALIF. L. REv. 1023, 1025 (2010) (noting that there are
"shocking racial disparities at every level" in the American criminal justice system); Jonathan

A. Rapping, Implicitly Unjust: How Defenders Can Affect Systemic Racist Assumptions, 16
N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 999, 1000 (2013) (noting the "obvious" fact that the criminal
justice system has a "disparate impact on people of color"); MARK COSTANZO, JUST REVENGE:
COSTS AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE DEATH PENALTY 79-84 (1997); id. at 80 (noting that, of
over 16,000 executions since 1608, only thirty-one have been for a white person killing a Black
person); id. (finding that between 1930 and 1967, 89% of defendants executed for rape were

Black); William J. Bowers et al., Death Sentencing in Black and White: An EmpiricalAnalysis
of the Role ofdurors'Raceand JwyRacial Composition, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 171, 175 (2001).
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Schwarzschild, then President of the American Bar Association,
testified to the Senate Judiciary Committee in 1978 that we select not
the most heinous murderers for death, but instead Black people and
poor people "for reasons having nothing to do whatever with their
crime. "10 Whether explicitly or implicitly, prosecutors have sought the
death penalty more often for people of color and have openly invoked
racial bias at trial. 1" Prosecutors have also been trained to exclude
people of color from serving as jurors and to hide their motivations,
making the continuing phenomenon of all-white juries a twenty-first
century disgrace.1 2
110. To Establish RationalCriteriafor the Imposition of CapitalPunishment:Hearings
Before the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 95th Cong. 90 (1978); see also
Corinna Barrett Lain, Madison and the Mentally Ill: The Death Penaltyfor the Weak Not the
Worst, 31 REGENT U. L. REV. 209, 232 (2019) (explaining that the death penalty "is not for the
worst of the worst. It is for the weak among the worst.").

111. Robert J. Smith & Justin D. Levinson, The Impact ofJImplicit Racial Bias on the
Exercise of ProsecutorialDiscretion, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 795, 797 (2012) ("[l]mplicit
racial attitudes and stereotypes skew prosecutorial decisions in a range of racially biased
ways."); id. at 819 (noting that even "egalitarian-minded prosecutors nonetheless
disproportionately strike black jurors"); Justin D. Levinson & Danielle Young, Different

Shades cfBias: Skin Tone, Implicit Racial Bias, and Judgments ofnAmbiguous Evidence, 112
W.VA. L. REV. 307, 309-10 (2010) (explaining that "even the simplest of racial cues ... might
automatically and unintentionally evoke racial stereotypes" that affect jurors); COSTANZO,

supra note 109, at

81-82; DAVID C. BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY:

A LEGAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

110-11 (1990); David C. Baldus et al., Racial

Discriminationand the Death Penalty in the Post-Furman Era: An Empirical and Legal
Overview, with Recent Findingsfrom Philadelphia,83 CORNELL L. REV. 1638, 1659-60, 169294, 1713-15 (1998); Stephen B. Bright, Discrimination, Death and Denial: The Tolerance of
Racial Discriminationin Infliction of the Death Penalty, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 433, 43334 (1995); see Flowers v. State, 947 So. 2d 910, 937 (Miss. 2007) (finding that twenty years
after the Supreme Court prohibited it "racially-motivated jury selection is still prevalent");
Bowers et al., supra note 109, at 175; see also Justin D. Levinson et al., Guilty by Implicit

Racial Bias: The Guilty/Not Guilty Implicit Association Test Commentaries, 8 OHIO ST. J.
CRIM. L. 187, 207-08 (2010) (discussing the impact of implicit attitudes on trials).
112. EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, ILLEGAL RACIAL DISCRIMINATION INJURY SELECTION:
A CONTINUING LEGACY 4-6 (2010); Abbe Smith, A Call to Abolish PeremptoryChallenges by
Prosecutors,27 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1163, 1164 (2014) (noting that prosecutors continue to
strike Black jurors and try Black and Brown defendants by all-white juries); Bowers et al.,
supra note 109, at 176-77, 263; Radelet & Pierce, supra note 108, at 618-19 (finding that
prosecutors often seek the death penalty based on the crime's racial configuration and "do so
in a way that greatly reduces the possibilities" to discover their discriminatory motivations).
For two recent examples, see Flowers v. Mississippi, 139 S. Ct. 2228, 2233, 2246 (2019)
(concluding that the State engaged in a "relentless, determined effort to rid the jury" of Black
jurors so it could try the defendant "before an all-white jury"); Foster v. Chatman, 136 S. Ct.
1737, 1742, 1755 (2016) (finding that prosecutors struck all five potential Black jurors and the
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Defense lawyers must be aware that many jurors hold explicit and
implicit biases against people of color and will employ them in jury
deliberations. 3 For example, the United States Supreme Court
reversed Keith Tharpe's conviction where a juror signed an affidavit
concluding Tharpe was a "n*****" and was not in the "'good' black
folks category." 1 4 In another case, a Black female juror-who
earnestly supported a life sentence for a Black defendant-endured
seven hours of racial threats and slurs from eleven white jurors who
called her a "n***** woman," drew "demeaning pictures" of her, and
threatened to victimize her if she did not vote for death." 5 An all-white
Utah jury on a case with two Black defendants had a note that depicted
a hanging with the words, "Hang the N*****s" on it." 6
With these serious concerns in mind, jurors are much more likely
to sentence a person of color to death, especially if they murder a white
person." 7 Researchers have found that jurors can consciously and even
record "plainly demonstrates a concerted effort to keep black prospective jurors off the jury");
see also Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 104 & n.3 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring) (noting
that Dallas County prosecution manual expressly advised district attorneys to strike racial
minorities).
113. Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, White JurorBias: An Investigation
of PrejudiceagainstBlack Defendants in the American Courtroom, 7 PSYCH. PUB. POL'Y & L.
201, 202 (2001) ("The pervasive and deleterious effects of White juror bias ... led to the
present focus on White jurors.").
114. Tharpe v. Sellers, 138 S. Ct. 545, 546 (2018) (per curiam). In Tharpe's case some
"jurors voted for death because they felt Tharpe should be an example to other blacks who kill
blacks." Id. Tharpe lost his case on remand. Tharpe v. Warden, 898 F.3d 1342, 1347 (11 th Cir.
2018), cert. denied, Tharpe v. Ford, 139 S. Ct. 911 (2019). Justice Sotomayor noted that Tharpe
had presented "truly striking evidence of juror bias" and that he showed "racism can and does
seep into the jury system." Id. at 913 (Sotomayor, J., statement respecting the denial of
certiorari).
115. Bryan Stevenson, Keynote Address by Mr. Bryan Stevenson, 53 DEPAUL L. REV.

1699, 1711 (2004).
116. Andrews v. Shulsen, 600 F. Supp. 408, 419 (D. Utah 1984); State v. Andrews, 576
P.2d 857, 859 (Utah 1978). No court even held a hearing on the note. Stephen B. Bright, The
Electric Chairand the Chain Gang: Choicesand ChallengesforAmerica'sFuture, 71 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 845, 855 (1996). See Andrews, 576 P.2d at 859 (praising "the professional
manner" jurors, the bailiff, and the court handled "this unfortunate incident"); Andrews, 600 F.
Supp. at 419; Andrews v. Shulsen, 802 F.2d 1256, 1266 (10th Cir. 1986); Andrews v. Shulsen,

485 U.S. 919, 920-21 (1988) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (citing courts'
failure to inquire into the racial animus in the community and the jury).
117. David C. Baldus & George Woodworth, Race Discrimination in the
Administration of the Death Penaltv: An Overview of the Empirical Evidence with Special
Emphasis on the Post-1990 Research, 39 CRIM. L. BULL. 194, 199-214 (2003); Catherine M.

Grosso et al., Race Discriminationand the Death Penalty: An Empiricaland Legal Overview,
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unconsciously apply dangerous, race-based stereotypes to those of
different races.11 '
Because, as Justice Blackmun once wrote, "race continues to play
a major role in determining who shall live and who shall die,"
defendants of color and their attorneys can lose hope of obtaining a fair
trial. 1 9 However, they cannot choose inaction because they are afraid
of being accused of "playing the race card" and must, instead, attempt
to uncover juror biases. 20
in AMERICA'S EXPERIMENT WITH CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: REFLECTIONS ON THE PAST, PRESENT,
AND FUTURE OF THE ULTIMATE PENAL SANCTION (James R. Acker et al. eds., 3d ed. 2014);

Brewer, supra note 70, at 531; id. at 540 (noting that jurors are more receptive to defendants
of their own race in opposite-race killings); Devine & Kelly, supra note 59, at 394; William J.
Bowers et al., The Capital Sentencing Decision: Guided Discretion, Reasoned Moral
Judgment, or Legal Fiction, in AMERICA'S EXPERIMENT WITH CAPITAL PUNISHMENT:
REFLECTIONS ON THE PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE OF THE ULTIMATE PENAL SANCTION 458-59

&

(James R. Acker et al. eds., 2d ed. 2003); Craig Haney & Mona Lynch, ComprehendingLife
and Death Matters: A PreliminaryStudy of California'sCapitalPenalty Instruction, 18 L.
HUM. BEHAV. 411, 415 (1994); Ellen S. Cohn et al., Reducing White Juror Bias: The Role of
Race Salience and Racial Attitudes, 39 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCH. 1953, 1954 (2009)
(summarizing that researchers' "overwhelming consensus" is that jurors are more likely to find
Black defendants guilty); Wolfgang & Riedel, supra note 108, at 123-33 (finding that,
compared to white defendants, Black defendants have received death sentences at a rate "that
exceeds any statistical notion of chance or fortuity"); see Mona Lynch & Craig Haney,
Discrimination and Instructional Comprehension: Guided Discretion, Racial Bias, and the
Death Penalty, 24 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 337, 349 (2000).
118. Phillip Atiba Goff et al., Not Yet Human: Implicit Knowledge, Historical
Dehumanization, and Contemporary Consequences, 94 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 292,
304 (2008); Ronald J. Tabak, The Continuing Role of Race in CapitalCases, Notwithstanding
President Obama's Election, 37 N. KY. L. REv. 243, 252 (2010) (finding that, despite the
assertions of most people, they apply racial stereotypes of Black criminality); Justin D.
Levinson, Race, Death, and the Complicitous Mind, 58 DEPAUL L. REv. 599, 632 (2009)
(noting that jury "death qualification primes racial stereotypes" with jurors); see BRYAN C.
EDELMAN, RACIAL PREJUDICE, JUROR EMPATHY, AND SENTENCING IN DEATH PENALTY CASES
3-4 (2006). One researcher concluded that a defendant's race "does not have a consistent
impact" on a jury's vote, while the victim's race "does have a consistent and robust influence"
on their sentence. Berry III, supranote 82, at 902-03 (observing also that jurors are more likely
to vote for death against a person of color based on a fear "that the defendant poses a personal
danger").

119. Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1153 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).

Ibram

X. Kendi powerfully lamented that the nightmare for a person of color "is knowing that racist
Americans will never end it. Anti-racism is on you, and only you." Ibram X. Kendi, The
American Nightmare, ATLANTIC (June 1, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/
2020/06/american-nightmare/612457/.
120. Andrea D. Lyon, Naming the Dragon: Litigating Race Issues During a Death
Penalty Trial, 53 DEPAUL L. REv. 1647, 1661 (2004); Tabak, supra note 118, at 249 (noting
that, while jurors rarely make explicitly racist statements, sometimes they will reveal their
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Attorneys must learn to have hard conversations with jurors and
simultaneously make them feel comfortable expressing their racial
views."' This is clearly challenging and requires training. 2 Merely
alerting jurors that discrepancies between their conscious and
unconscious responses may impact their decision making often
prompts some jurors to check their racial biases and to try to be fair.12
As Suzanne Plihcik recently described to the New Yorker, one can
convey to jurors that racism is not always intentional, that they can be
"a beneficiary of a system set up hundreds of years ago," and that while
white culture is acceptable, they should take steps to ensure it does not
impose itself on others. 24
Instead of lecturing jurors, lawyers should try to open a
conversation so that those who hold intractable race-based viewpoints
but know how to provide a "socially acceptable response" feel

biases "if they feel comfortable or if they respond quickly and automatically"); REM EDDOLODGE, WHY I'M No LONGER TALKING TO WHITE PEOPLE ABOUT RACE xvii (2017) ("Every
voice raised against racism chips away at its power. We can't afford to stay silent."); see
Sommers & Ellsworth, supra note 113, at 221; Smith, supra note 112, at 1183-85; see also
Jeffrey Abramson, Anger at Angry Jurors, 82 CHL-KENT L. REV. 591, 595, 603-07 (2007)
(commenting on the impact ofjuror on jury nullification). while "race-relevant voir dire" can
positively affect the verdict, some jurors will be "annoyed by questions about racism." Samuel

R. Sommers, On Racial Diversity and Group Decision Making: Identifying Multiple Effects of
Racial Composition on Jury Deliberations,90 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 597, 601 (2006);
Tabak, supra note 118, at 265. Even if courts are reluctant to allow this type of questioning,
some have argued that by litigating race issues pretrial, the judge and prosecutor are more likely
to grant more flexibility in voir dire. Tabak, supra note 118, at 269; see Blume et al., supra
note 20, at 123943.
121. Smith, supra note 112, at 1175; Tabak, supra note 118, at 264 (emphasizing that
defense lawyers need jurors "who talk honestly" about their racial views "rather than denying
that they have any racial attitudes").
122. Reni Eddo-Lodge expressed exasperation with these conversations because of the
"denials, awkward cartwheels and mental acrobatics" from white people who do not even see
a problem and troublingly, feel silenced by race, but glaringly fail to empathize with people
who have "been visibly marked out as different for our entire lives, and live the consequences."
EDDO-LODGE, supra note 120, at xi-xii; id. at 215 (discussing racism is about a "white anxiety"
that defines itself against bogey monsters for its own security).
123. Rapping, supra note 109, at 1021-22; Tabak, supra note 118, at 260; see John F.

Dovidio et al., On the Nature of Prejudice: Automatic and Controlled Processes, 33 J.
EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCH. 510, 535 (1997). Tabak explains that attorneys might prefer a
juror who acknowledges racial attitudes and commits to work on it over one who denies racism
but appears to hold implicit attitudes. Tabak, supra note 118, at 259.

124. The New Yorker Radio Hour, Getting White People to Talk About Racism,
NEw YORKER, at 06:40 (June 12, 2020), https://www.newyorker.com/podcast/the-new-yorker
-radio-hour/getting-white-people-to-talk-about-racism.
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comfortable opening up more deeply. 2 1 This strategy requires careful
attention to the juror's discomfort, to their attitudes, and even to their
facial expressions. 2 6 Attorneys must normalize unpopular responses,
which they can do in the abstract, such as asking jurors about the
negative experiences their friends, family, or others have had with those
of other races. 22 A simple question could be, "What have you heard
others say about Black men in America today?" The point is for
attorneys to be nonjudgmental, to get jurors talking, and to listen.
B.

Juror-specificFactors

Lawyers also need to assess how jurors' personality
characteristics or experiences might affect their sentencing decision.
1.

How Susceptible is This Juror to Peer Pressure?

Defense lawyers must rate a juror's susceptibility to peer
pressure.12 8 We know that as jurors deliberate, their sentences get more
severe. 21 That is because, as Saby Ghoshray has written, their
deliberations are not objective, do not involve a search for human
dignity, or do not encourage individual free-thinking.' We need to
recognize that jury deliberations are not the sort of civil debates where

125.

Bidish J. Sarma, Challengesand Opportunitiesin Bringingthe Lessons of Cultural

Competence to Bear on Capital Jury Selection, 42 U. MEM. L. REv. 907, 930-31 (2012);
Rapping, supra note 109, at 1028-29. John McWhorter has argued it is extremely
counterproductive to muzzle, straightjacket, and chloroform white Americans so "that pretty
much anything they say or think is racist and thus antithetical to the good." John McWhorter,
The Dehumanizing Condescensiono/ White Fragility,ATLANTIC (July 15, 2020), https://www.
theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/07/dehumanizing-condescension-white-fragility/614146/.
126. Tabak, supra note 118, at 264.
127. See Rapping, supra note 109, at 1031-35; Sarma, supra note 125, at 931.
128. See Connell, supra note 71, at 167. Indeed, one multivariate analysis found it
highly significant that the more positively jurors view the jury deliberation climate, the more
likely they are to vote for death. Id. at 167, 169-70.
129. Yvonne Hardaway Osborne eta]., An Investigationof Persuasionand Sentencing
Severity with Mock Juries,4 BEHAv. ScI. & L. 339, 346-47 (1986).
130. Saby Ghoshray, Capital Jury Decision Making: Looking Through the Prism of
Social Conformity and Seduction to Symmetry, 67 U. MIA. L. REv. 477, 483-84 (2013); see
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 272-73 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring) (noting that the
death penalty "treat[s] members of the human race as nonhumans, as objects to be toyed with
and discarded. They are thus inconsistent with the fundamental premise of the [Cruel and
Unusual Punishments] Clause that even the vilest criminal remains a human being possessed
of common human dignity.").
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people hear each other out and move toward a middle position.13 1 They
are bully fests. Cramped in tiny rooms, rife with passion, life-prone
jurors frequently end up surrendering under the extraordinary pressure
they endure from death-voting jurors."'
For example, in a case in the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit,133 eleven jurors who felt the one holdout was
"uncooperative" and would not deliberate told the court the juror was
at a "breaking point" and wanted to be excused.34 The juror later
testified that he was not ill, but was severely affected by the intense
pressure from jurors, who, once they got him off, found the defendant
guilty and voted for death. 13 1 On a different case, one juror said, "I was
not able to stand up to the other bullies on the jury."'3 6 Jurors called a
holdout on a different case "spineless" and "gutless," and leveled
vicious tirades against the holdout, prompting a separate juror to
change their vote to life "just to take the pressure off" the holdout.1 37
In the Georgia case of William Henry Hance, a Black defendant,
although the jury was initially more split, death-favoring jurors
eventually persuaded all but two of the life-voters, a Black woman and
a white woman, to change their votes. ' The white woman switched
because jurors inaccurately told her that if they hung, there would have
to be a new trial.' 39 The Black juror refused to concede, so the
foreperson took the extraordinary step of telling the judge that the jury
had unanimously agreed on a death sentence. 40 When the court polled
the jury, the holdout was too frightened to state otherwise. 41 Despite
raising this issue in post-conviction proceedings, Hance's claims were
131. Carpenter, supra note 58, at 8-9; see SUNDBY, supra note 61, at 51 (giving an
example).
132. Carpenter, supra note 58, at 8; Ghoshray, supra note 130, at 484; see also Osborne
et al., supra note 129, at 346 (finding group sentencing more severe than individual
sentencing).

133. Peek v. Kemp, 746 F.2d 672 (11th Cir. 1984).
134. Id. at 675, 677; Peek v. Kemp, 784 F.2d 1479, 1482, 1506-07 (11th Cir. 1986) (en
banc) (Johnson, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 421 (1986).

135. Peek, 746 F.2d at 676-77; Peek, 784 F.2d at 1482, 1484; id. at 1504 (Johnson, J.,
dissenting).
136. Ghoshray, supra note 130, at 478 n.4 (quoting Michael Landauer, Does It Matter

I/fa JurorHas Regrets?, July 19, 2011).
137. Joseph L. Hoffmann, Where's the Buck?-Juror Misperception of Sentencing
Responsibility in Death Penalty Cases, 70 IND. L.J. 1137, 1144-45 (1995).
138. Bob Herbert, Jury Room Injustice, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 1994, at Al 5.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
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denied and he was executed. 4 2 The juror "was so heartbroken and
guilt-ridden that she said she would never forgive herself for having
kept silent until" it was "too late to save Hance's life."1 43 Life-prone
jurors rarely change their minds about the punishment; instead, they
later regret that they surrendered to the others' pressure. 4 4
As the Colorado Method encourages, attorneys should strengthen
life-prone jurors' resolve and remind other jurors to respect each juror's
opinion.'4 5 But the research has also shown that life jurors simply need
more support; they need more allies.'4 6 It takes at least a quarter to a
third of jurors to vote for life, typically, to "act[] as a counterweight" to
death-prone jurors' pressures, since most jurors will eventually
capitulate to whatever sentence two-thirds of the jurors support on their
first vote.1 47 While there are cases where lone holdouts managed to flip
the jury,1 48 attorneys are better served by assessing jurors' susceptibility
to group pressure and trying to get the most committed and as many
life-sympathizers as they can on the jury.
2.

Is This Juror Predisposed to Impose a Particular Sentence?

Jurors who favor the death penalty are more likely to prejudge the
case and are also more likely to impose a death sentence.1'4 9 Because
142. Bob Herbert, Judicial Coin Toss, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 1994, at Eli; David Dow,
Panel Discussion, The Death of Fairness: Counsel Competency and Due Process in Death
Penalty Cases, 31 Hous. L. REV. 1105, 1190 (1994).
143. Herbert, supra note 142, at Eli; Dow, supra note 142, at 1190.
144. Hoffmnann, supra note 137, at 1145; Carpenter, supra note 58, at 8; SOLOMON E.
ASCH, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 450 (1952) (noting that people often are pressured "to act contrary
to their beliefs and values").
145. Parloff, supra note 13, at 91; Steffen, supra note 4.
146. Devine & Kelly, supra note 59, at 395; Eisenberg et al., supra note 68, at 278; REID
HASTIE ET AL., INSIDE THE JURY 27 (1983) ("A result obtained in virtually all research on small
decision-making groups is that larger factions, within a group, exert more influence on the
group's decision than do smaller factions."); HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE
AMERICAN JURY 488 (1966) ("[I]n the instances where there is an initial majority ... the jury
in roughly nine out of ten cases decides in the direction of the initial majority.").
147. Devine & Kelly, supra note 59, at 395, 400, 402-03; SUNDBY, supra note 61, at
158; Carpenter, supra note 58, at 8; Norbert L. Kerr et al., Bias in Jurors vs Bias in Juries:
New Evidence from the SDS Perspective, 80 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION
PROCESSES 70, 73 (1999); Eisenberg et al., supra note 68, at 278. Devine and Kelly opine that
if a "critical threshold" of eight or nine jurors vote for death on the first vote, this strongly
predicts a death sentence. Devine & Kelly, supra note 59, at 402.
148. Hoffmann, supra note 137, at 1149; see Costanzo & Costanzo, supra note 66, at
159 (noting that jurors frustratingly ended deliberations when life holdouts refused to yield).
149. Devine & Kelly, supra note 59, at 394; Blume et al., supra note 68, at 169.
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people ideologically self-identify with their position on the death
penalty, they are "relatively immune to evidence and argument" and
remain committed to death from the outset. 50 Troublingly, as many as
30% ofjurors hold such strong dispositions toward death sentences that
they would automatically be disqualified from service.' 5 ' These early
death adopters manage to pass jury qualification and "push the final
verdict heavily toward death." Those who change their votes to life
usually only do so to avoid a hung jury, not because they were
persuaded by the evidence or the deliberations. 5 3 Life-committed
absolutists similarly can serve, and, in one study, 65% of them voted
for life because of their personal scruples about the death penalty. 5
Multiple studies have shown that as many as half to two-thirds of
CJP jurors had decided, before the sentencing proceeding even started,
that death was the appropriate sentence and they never wavered from
that decision. 55 As one Oregon juror recalled, "everyone had their
mind made up before the penalty phase started."' 5 6 Even worse, many
of these jurors think they are requiredtoimpose a death sentence ifthey

150. Eisenberg et al., supra note 68, at 307; Eisenberg et al., supra note 88, at 377-78;
Bowers et al, supra note 117, at 428. As many as 75% of CJP jurors who chose death before
the penalty phase never changed their verdict. Foglia, supra note 83, at 198.
151. Eisenberg et al., supra note 68, at 279; william J. Bowers et al., Foreclosed
Impartiality in Capital Sentencing: Jurors' Predispositions. Guilt-Trial Experience, and
PrematureDecision Making, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1476, 1504 (1998); Dillehay & Sandys,
supra note 35, at 149, 156-59; Geimer & Amsterdam, supra note 69, at 39.
152. Eisenberg et al., supra note 68, at 279.
153. Bowers & Foglia, supra note 43, at 57-58.
154. Samuel R. Gross, Update: American Public Opinion on the Death Penalty-It's
Getting Personal,83 CORNELL L. REV. 1448, 1472 (1998); Geimer & Amsterdam, supra note
69, at 27.
155. Bowers et al., supra note 151, at 1504-07; Bowers, supra note 58, at 221; Bowers,
supranote 70, at 1093; Marla Sandys, Cross-Overs-CapitalJurorsWho Change TheirMinds

About the Punishment: A Litmus Test for Sentencing Guidelines, 70 INo. L.J. 1183, 1192-95
(1995); Vartkessian, supra note 82, at 278; Foglia, supra note 83, at 192 (noting that most early
death supporters were "absolutely convinced, never wavered from that position," and discussed
punishment during the guilt phase); id. at 197-98 (finding that 54% of jurors "had already
decided what the sentence should be"); Thomas w. Brewer, The Attorney-Client Relationship
in Capital Cases andIts Impact on JurorReceptivity to Mitigation Evidence, 22 JusT. Q. 340,
359 (2005) (remarking that premature death-voters "were 53 percent less likely to show
increased receptivity to mitigation"); Brewer, supra note 70, at 539; Luginbuhl & Howe, supra

note 80, at 1177.
156.

Costanzo & Costanzo, supra note 66, at 161.
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believe the defendant is guilty.'" This phenomenon has been called a
"presumption of death."" As one Florida juror put it, "[w]e were all
ready to hang him, but we went over the list so we would be within the
law ... to get it right.""'
The jury selection process itself can give this impression.' 60 When
jurors see the court excuse those with doubts about the death penalty, it
communicates that the court appears to prefer a death sentence.1 6
Jurors need only follow the "obedience drill." 162 As one Indiana juror
thought, the verdict was predetermined, and the jury had "a
responsibility to come back with a death sentence."' 63 Another juror in
a different case said, "the State of Florida called for the death penalty.
There didn't seem to be any choice."' 64
Attorneys must dialogue with jurors about the consequences of
prejudging the case and evaluate and rank jurors on how likely they are
to remain intractable or open and evaluative.

157. Geimer & Amsterdam, supra note 69, at 43-47; Garvey, supra note 80, at 38;
Eisenberg et al., supra note 70, at 359-60 (finding that nearly one-third of jurors mistakenly
thought a death sentence was required if they found heinousness); Blume et al., supranote 20,
at 1223-24; Bowers et al., supra note 151, at 1497-98; Dillehay & Sandys, supra note 35, at
158-59; Blume et al., supra note 68, at 151-52; Susan D. Rozelle, The PrincipledExecutioner:

CapitalJuries'Bias and the Benefits of True Bifurcation, 38 ARtz. ST. LJ. 769, 789 (2006)
(noting that anywhere from two to eight jurors are likely to mistakenly believe they must
impose a death sentence).
158. Eisenberg & Wells, supra note 80, at 12, 38 n.12 (explaining that the sentencing
phase begins "with a substantial bias in favor of death," leading jurors to give death "by
default" without considering legal standards); Luginbuhl & Howe, supra note 80, at 1177;
Geimer & Amsterdam, supra note 69, at 41-46.
159. Geimer & Amsterdam, supra note 69, at 25.
160. Bowers & Foglia, supra note 43, at 66; Haney, On the Selection of CapitalJuries,
supra note 45, at 128-29; Bowers & Foglia, supra note 43, at 62-65 ("[T]here also is evidence
that the questioning during voir dire itself prejudices jurors toward finding the defendant guilty
and imposing a death sentence.").
161. Bowers & Foglia, supra note 43, at 61-64; Haney, On the Selection of Capital
Juries, supra note 45, at 128-29; see Mike Allen et al., Impact of JurorAttitudes About the

Death Penaltyon JurorEvaluationsof Guilt and Punishment:A Meta-Analvsis, 22 L. & HUM.
BEHAV. 715, 716-19, 725-26 (1998).
162. Craig Haney, Violence and the Capital Jury: Mechanisms of Moral
Disengagement and the Impulse to Condemn to Death, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1447, 1482 (1997).
163. Hoffmann, supra note 137, at 1152.
164. Geimer & Amsterdam, supra note 69, at 25.
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How Well Will This Juror Understand and Apply Jury
Instructions Regarding the Consideration of Mitigating
Evidence?

One capital jury foreperson explained the jury's frustration with
the lack of guidance they received from the court: "[w]e were drowning
and we wanted some kind of help. And when it's that serious, for God
sake [sic] when you're pleading for help, you have to give us
something. We were reasonable people, intelligent people, making a
very difficult decision, asking for help.""' While the Supreme Court
has mandated that jurors' have guidance so that they limit the
imposition of the death penalty to the "worst of the worst,"'66 CJP
research has demonstrated that jurors do not grasp these legal
burdens.1 67 Lawyers and judges rarely if ever gauge jurors'
comprehension, and the few times jurors have explained their
understanding, "the appellate courts have run away in horror. "168
Part of the problem is that jury instructions are written in what
Robert Weisberg has called the "mystifying language of legal
formality," or as one juror said, "gobbly gook, mumbo jumbo."16 9
165. Alan Berlow, A .1mw of Your Peers? Only If You're Clueless, WASH. POST, Aug.
11, 2002, at Bi; Alan Berlow, American Radioworks, Deadly Decisions: Juror Conf/sion,
AMERICAN RADIOWORKS (Aug. 2002), http://americanradioworks.publicradio.org/features/
deadlydecisions/confusion-print.html.

166. Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 206 (2006) (Souter, J., dissenting).
167. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 207 (1976); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279,
363 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("There perhaps is an inherent tension between the discretion
accorded capital sentencing juries and the guidance for use of that discretion that is
constitutionally required.").
168. Dow, supra note 142, at 1170 (citing United States ex rel. Free v. Peters, 806 F.
Supp. 705 (N.D. Ill. 1992); Free v. Peters, 12 F.3d 700, 705-06 (7th Cir. 1993); SUNDBY, supra
note 61, at 161; Luginbuhl & Howe, supra note 80, at 1181; see also Foglia, supra note 83, at
190-91 (explaining that "jurors need accurate information" since they ask questions about
sentencing and judges refuse to answer directly).
169. Robert Weisberg, Deregulating Death, 1983 SUP. CT. REV. 305, 392 (1983);
SUNDBY, supra note 61, at 166; Vartkessian, supra note 82, at 250; Luginbuhl & Howe, supra

note 80, at 1169; Steven J. Sherman, The CapitalJury Project: The Role ofResponsibility and
How P.vchology Can Inform the Law, 70 IND. L.J. 1241, 1241 (1994); David Barron, I Did
Not Want to Kill Him but Thought I Had To: In Light of'Penry H's InterpretationofBlystone,

Why the Constitution RequiresJury Instructions on How to Give Effect to Relevant Mitigation
Evidence in Capital Cases,

1l

J.L. & POL'Y 207, 246 (2002); James Frank & Brandon K.

&

Applegate, Assessing Juror Understanding of Capital-SentencingInstructions, 44 CRiME
DELNQ. 412, 419-26 (1998); Sandys, supra note 155, at 1203-04, 1210-11, 1212-13 n.55;
Costanzo & Costanzo, supra note 68, at 188; Ursula Bentele & William J. Bowers, How Jurors

Decide on Death: Guilt Is Overwhelming; Aggravation Requires Death; and Mitigation Is No
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Capital jurors face a gut-wrenching and emotionally difficult decision,
but paradoxically, the instructions courts give them are unfeeling,
highly legal, technical, opaque, and incomprehensible.17 0
The "overwhelming evidence" from the CJP research
demonstrates that jurors do not understand or properly apply" the
standards of aggravation and mitigation that the law requires them to
consider.' 7 1 Operating under cognitive "biases and misunderstandings,
they construe the instructions in substantially prejudicial ways against
defendants. 17 2 In every aspect of the instructions, CJP researchers have
discovered a "tilt toward death" in jurors' understandings.' 73 And
because the instructions actually promote ignorance on the death
penalty's actual operation, they create "chaos and confusion" in

Excuse, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 1011, 1044 (2001); Peter A. Barta, Note, Between Death and a
Hard Place: Hopkins v. Reeves and the "Stark Choice" Between Capital Conviction and

OutrightAcquittal, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1429, 1458 n.213 (2000); Richard L. Wiener et al.,
Guided Jury Discretion in CapitalMurder Cases: The Role of Declarativeand Procedural
Knowledge, 10 PSYCH. PUB. POL'Y & L. 516, 570-74 (2004); Haney & Lynch, supra note 117,
at 414; see also Devine & Kelly, supra note 59, at 395 (commenting on juror confusion with
jury instructions).
170. Costanzo & Costanzo, supra note 66, at 166-67; valerie P. Hans, Death by Jury,

in
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(Kenneth C. Haas & James A. Inciardi eds., 1988). Commentators have suggested at a
minimum, courts improve instructions using "psycholinguistic principles of clear speech" and
simpler sentence structure and definitions that "take into account jurors' prior assumptions

about law." Valerie P. Hans, How JuriesDecide Death: The Contributionsof the CapitalJury
Project, 70 IND. L.J. 1233, 1239 (1995) [hereinafter Hans, How JuriesDecide Death];Bethany
K. Dumas, Jury Trials: Lay Jurors, PatternJury Instructions, and Comprehension Issues, 67
TENN. L. REV. 701, 702-03 (2000).
171. Bowers & Foglia, supra note 43, at 66-84 (summarizing numerous research
findings on capital jurors' inability to understand jury instructions); Barron, supra note 169, at
241; Foglia, supra note 83, at 192, 199; Bowers, supra note 58, at 221; Bentele & Bowers,
supra note 169, at 1043-44; Devine & Kelly, supra note 59, at 395; Blume et al., supra note
20, at 1228-30 (noting that CJP findings indicate that large numbers of jurors are "mitigation
impaired-unable or unwilling" to consider mitigation factors); Vartkessian, supra note 82, at
265; Craig Haney et al., Deciding to Take a Life: CapitalJuries, Sentencing Instructions, and
the Jurisprudenceof Death, 50 J. SOC. ISSUES 149, 167-74 (1994); Haney & Lynch, supra note
117, at 420 (discussing serious confusion related to the term mitigation); Shari Seidman
Diamond & Judith N. Levi, Improving Decisions on Death by Revising and Testing Jury
Instructions, 79 JUDICATURE 224, 230 (1996) (finding that 45% of jurors misunderstood
meaning of mitigation).
172. Foglia, supra note 83, at 201, 204.
173. Bowers, supra note 58, at 222.
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deliberations, which pro-death jurors exploit to convince pro-life jurors
to switch their votes.1 74
One Pennsylvania study found that nearly every capital juror
(98.6%) "failed to understand at least some of the instructions" and
disturbingly, only 9.5% of those jurors did not have "at least one of the
problems to a prejudicial or extreme extent." 7 5 In another study, only
8% of jurors could offer legally correct definitions of aggravation and
mitigation, even after they had heard the instructions read three
times. 76 Studies have shown that large percentages of capital jurors
think the death penalty is mandatory in certain situations, such as if they
find the existence of certain aggravators, when it is not.' 7 7 They also
tend to misapply the burdens, such as a beyond a reasonable doubt
standard for mitigation evidence or a preponderance standard to
aggravating factors, opposite of what the law requires.1 78 Many jurors
likewise think they must unanimously agree on the existence of
mitigating factors.'"
One significant problem is the relative precision of aggravators
and the relative imprecision of mitigators.' 80 Aggravating factors tend
174. See Haney, supra note 64, at 1225-26; Haney, supra note 162, at 1479. As Haney
argues, we ask capital juries "to do the moral dirty work of a system that is not even honest
enough with them" to give jurors the "full story" of the "purposes, ambiguities, complexities,
and consequences" of the punishment the state wants them to impose. Haney, supra note 64,
at 1232.
Foglia, supra note 83, at 199, 201.
Haney & Lynch, supra note 117, at 420-21.
177. Luginbuhl & Howe, supra note 80, at 1173-74; Bowers, supra note 58, at 221-22
("Four out of [ten] capital jurors wrongly believed they were 'required' to impose the death
penalty if they found that the crime was heinous, vile, or depraved, and nearly as many
mistakenly thought the death penalty was 'required' if they found that the defendant would be
dangerous in the future."); Bentele & Bowers, supra note 169, at 1031; Barron, supranote 169,
at 244-45; Bowers, supra note 70, at 1091. The death penalty cannot be mandatorily imposed.
Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 333 (1976) (plurality opinion); Woodson v. North
175.

176.

Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303 (1976); see Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 971-72 (1994).
178. Connell, supra note 71, at 170; Blume et al., supra note 68, at 158; Blume et al.,
supra note 20, at 1230; Bowers et al., supra note 117, at 437; Luginbuhl & Howe, supra note
80, at 1169-70; Eisenberg & Wells, supra note 80, at 11; Barron, supra note 169, at 241-42.
"Deciding death is not something that is easily reduced to an algebraic exercise of weighing
aggravating and mitigating circumstances." Hans, How JuriesDecide Death, supra note 170,
at 1236. Jurors often misunderstand the reasonable doubt standard itself. See Leonard B. Sand
& Danielle L. Rose, ProofBeyond All Possible Doubt: Is There a Needfor a Higher Burden

of'Proof When the Sentence May Be Death?, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 1359, 1366 (2003).
179. Blume et al., supra note 68, at 158; Luginbuhl & Howe, supra note 80, at 1167;
Eisenberg & Wells, supra note 80, at 11; Foglia, supra note 83, at 193.
180. Haney & Lynch, supra note 117, at 430; Haney, supra note 64, at 1228 n.22.
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to be easy to understand and to prove: they are often answers to simple
yes or no questions, including something like a prior conviction or if
there were multiple victims.18 ' On the other hand, the instructions
elusively describe mitigating factors as subjective judgment calls,
which not only confuses jurors, but causes them to reject mitigating
factors when faced with "more vivid and tangible arguments about
aggravation."' 2
The instructions may even dangerously intimate that jurors
entirely ignore what they are legally required to evaluate: the
defendant's background, character, or person.' 8 3 An astonishing 94.6%
of capital jurors in Pennsylvania felt "the punishment should be
determined by what the defendant did, not what kind of person he or
she was."1 84 Jurors somehow come to believe that legally relevant
mitigating character evidence, such as mental illness or childhood
abuse, only matters if it justifiably excuses the murder.' 85 Consequently,
capital jurors entirely dismiss legally relevant character-based
mitigation and focus instead on crime-related mitigation, such as a
defendant's reduced culpability.1 8 6
181. Luginbuhl & Howe, supra note 80, at 1179-80; see Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S.
231, 244 (1988) ("The use of 'aggravating circumstances' is not an end in itself, but a means
of genuinely narrowing the class of death eligible persons and thereby channeling the jury's
discretion.").
182. Haney, supra note 64, at 1229-30; Blume et al., supranote 20, at 1228-31; Garvey,
supra note 68, at 1559; Luginbuhl & Howe, supra note 80, at 1179-80; Bowers et al., supra
note 117, at 439; see Watkins v. Murray, 493 U.S. 907, 910 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari) ("'Mitigating evidence' is a term of art, with a constitutional meaning
that is unlikely to be apparent to a lay jury."); Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299, 312 n.3
(1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (giving examples of jurors' confusion about mitigation and
trial courts' failures to adequately explain it to them). As one defense attorney told a jury, "[t]he
law doesn't tell you what a sufficient mitigating circumstance is either . . . [Instead,] the law
turns you loose in a certain way there to use your personal moral judgement... ." Vartkessian,
supra note 82, at 273.
183. Haney, supra note 64, at 1227-28.
184. Foglia, supra note 83, at 198.
185. See Bentele & Bowers, supra note 169, at 1042, 1052-53.
186. Id. at 1042-44; Trahan, supra note 45, at 1 ("[C]apital jurors are generally
unreceptive to mitigation and predisposed to vote in favor of death."); Foglia, supra note 83,
at 192 (explaining that capital jurors cannot meaningfully consider mitigation when over half
of them "consider[ed] death the only acceptable punishment" for three types of murder); id. at
199. When asked to give examples of relevant mitigation, jurors look to the crime itself, citing
examples like it was a crime of passion, or the defendant was less responsible for the killing,
or they lacked control over their actions. Vartkessian, supra note 82, at 270. One prosecutor
similarly gave crime-related examples of mitigation: "[I]s this a defendant who in some way
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"

If they consider a defendant's background, jurors often have
unreasonable expectations for what counts as mitigation. For example,
when one prospective juror expressed her reluctance to consider
mitigating evidence, the judge tried to rehabilitate her by asking if she
would consider a life sentence if the defendant had won a
Congressional Medal of Honor, was a war hero, or worked in an
orphanage with children with AIDS, as if only these extreme and
unrealistic examples amounted to legally justifiable mitigation.187
The most powerful character-based mitigating evidence for
jurors, unfortunately, are the categorical restrictions the United States
Supreme Court has already placed on the death penalty: a defendant's
intellectual disability and committing the crime when under the age of
eighteen.' 88 Jurors sometimes consider a defendant's age as mitigating,
if it is under twenty-five, which may also be somewhat attributed to a
relative lack of a violent criminal history.' 89
Some researchers have concluded jurors will treat child abuse as
mitigating under certain circumstances, especially if state institutions
failed to intervene or provide real help.'90 Many jurors, conversely, treat
a defendant's presentation of child abuse as a cheap excuse for murder,
an attempt to "pawn off' their conduct on their family, as one juror
said.' 9

immediately regretted what was done, tried to help the victim, tried to make amends, or is this
someone who callously just walked off? You look at all those things." Id. at 269.
187. Vartkessian, supra note 82, at 255. The court's examples "could have easily
blunted jurors' understanding of relevant mitigation." Id.

188.

Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304,317-21 (2002); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551,

575-78 (2005); Garvey, supra note 80, at 57; Garvey, supra note 68, at 1564. One study found
people with mild intellectual disabilities have been executed because jurors "misunderstood
the [intellectual disability] evidence and were persuaded by extralegal racial biases and

premature decision making." Leona Deborah Jochnowitz, Whether the Bright-Line Cut-o'
Rule and the Adversarial Expert Explanation of Adaptive FunctioningExacerbates Capital

Juror Comprehensionof the Intellectual Disabilitv,34 ToURo L. REv. 377, 429 (2018).

&

189. Sorensen & Marquart, supra note 71, at 771-72 (finding that defendants "twentyfive years of age or older received a death sentence more often than individuals ages seventeen
to twenty-four."). One multivariate regression analysis of the CJP data found that a defendant's
age, especially age eighteen, was the most significant mitigating factor in determining a life
sentence. Devine & Kelly, supra note 59, at 399.
190. Margaret C. Stevenson et al., Jurors' Discussions of a Defendant's History of
Child Abuse andAlcoholAbuse in CapitalSentencing Deliberations,16 PSYCH. PUB. POL'Y

L. 1, 25-28, 31-32 (2010); Garvey, supra note 68, at 1539.
191.

Bentele & Bowers, supranote 169, at 104647.
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Jurors also tend to treat mental illness, unless it borders on
insanity or extreme psychosis, as aggravating. 192 One study found that
90% of CJP jurors "rejected the defendants' diminished mental
capacities as having any mitigating effect." 19 ; As one CJP juror
explained, the claim that the defendant "was not working with a full
deck ... was stupid."' 94 Another said that "trying to make [the
defendant] out like a child" really "hurt their case."' 95
Jurors strongly dislike mitigating claims of drug and alcohol use
and abuse.' 96 As one juror put it, "nobody forced [the defendant] to take
drugs."1 97 Another noted that lots of people "have drug or alcohol
problems but they are not out committing capital murders. So I don't
consider that to be mitigating."' 98 Instead, they focus on seemingly
rational choices the defendant made leading up to the crime.1 99 Given
the strength of juries' negative reactions to this evidence, one
commentator suggests arguing that the defendant's drug or alcohol use
did "not prevent actions and choices;" instead, it affected "the decisionmaking process and decrease[d] inhibitions. "20
Jurors have split reactions to a defendant's disadvantaged or
deprived background. 201' Like drug and alcohol evidence, jurors who
negatively react to childhood trauma note that lots of people have
dysfunctional families and suffer childhood abuse, but they do not
commit capital murders. 202 Many jurors believe a defendant must take
192. Id. at 1048; Michelle E. Barnett et al., When Mitigation Evidence Makes a
Difference: Effectv of PsychologicalMitigating Evidence on Sentencing Decisions in Capital
Trials, 22 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 751, 753-54 (2004); Trahan, supra note 45, at 7; Lain, supra note
110, at 223-24 (observing that jurors see murderers with a severe mental illness as someone
who will be a significant danger in the future).
193. Trahan, supra note 45, at 7.

194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Stevenson et al., supra note 190, at 28-32; Garvey, supra note 80, at 57; Garvey,
supra note 68, at 1539, 1565; Trahan, supra note 45, at 7-8; Blume et al., supra note 20, at

1229-30.
197.

Vartkessian, supra note 82, at 266.

198. Id.
199.

Trahan, supra note 45, at 12-13.

200. Id. at 13.
201. Id. at 8-9. See also Vartkessian, supra note 82, at 280 (noting that jurors believed
that "the defendant's background and personal history" were not "legitimate sentencing
factors.").
202. Trahan, supra note 45, at 8-9. As one capital juror explained, "[tlhere are tons of
people in this world who have had atrocious things happen to them as children, way worse than
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personal responsibility for their choices. "He never made a point of
changing," one juror suggested, echoing similar comments by another
juror who felt that no matter what happened, "you have to be held
responsible for your actions at some point in time." 203 One scholar
suggests that lawyers respond to these concerns by emphasizing that
real recovery requires help from others and from institutions, including
counseling and treatment, which were likely not "realistic" options for
the defendant.204
Capital juries clearly misunderstand and misapply the law.2 05 In
essence, the research has shown that most jurors fairly quickly decide
that the defendant is guilty and then look to the instructions to frame
the decision they have already made. 206 Few capital jurors actually
remember the case in mitigation, since it comes so late in the process,
by which time they have already made up their minds. 207 During trial,
jurors experience a sort of information overload that causes them to
simplify their decision-making process and, rather than follow
established legal standards, they arbitrarily choose a sentence that feels
right.208
These concerns led one scholar to conclude that "no amount of
mitigation would be sufficient to escape a death sentence," because
jurors cannot engage in the "reasoned, moral decision-making that the
Court touted as central to the continued use of capital punishment." 2 09
Justice Harlan, writing for the Supreme Court, similarly admitted that
this guy, and they have turned out to be upstanding law-abiding citizens." Vartkessian, supra
note 82, at 267.
203. Trahan, supra note 45, at 8; Vartkessian, supra note 82, at 267.
204. Trahan, supra note 45, at 13.
205. Barron, supra note 169, at 246. As Barron argues, though the Supreme Court
requires jurors to consider mitigating evidence to avoid imposing an arbitrary and capricious
sentence, the right is meaningless "if the sentencing body is unable or incapable of giving effect
to this evidence in determining a sentence." Id. at 248.
206. Vartkessian, supra note 82, at 278; Bentele & Bowers, supra note 169, at 1053-60;
Krauss & Sales, supra note 85, at 279; Amy K. Phillips, Note, Thou Shalt Not Kill Any Nice
People: The Problem of Victim Impact Statements in Capital Sentencing, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
93, 101-112, 118 (1997); Hans, How JuriesDecide Death, supra note 170, at 1237-38; Bowers,
supra note 70, at 1093.
207. Bowers, supra note 70, at 1087, 1090-91; Haney, supra note 64, at 1228.
208. Katie Morgan & Michael J. Zydney Mannheimer, The Impact of Information

Overload on the CapitalJury's Ability to Assess Aggravatingand MitigatingFactors, 17 WM.
& MARY BILL RTs. J. 1089 (2009).
209.

Vartkessian, supra note 82, at 267-68. See also Penry v. Lynaugh (Penry1), 492

U.S. 302, 328 (1989), abrogated by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (discussing how
jurors must be able to consider mitigating evidence before they are able to properly use it).
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adequately identifying aggravating and mitigating factors and
expressing them in a way that "can be fairly understood and applied"
by jurors seems "beyond present human ability."2 10 This is why Wanda
Foglia calls capital jury instructions "legal fictions" that are stunningly
irrelevant.2 "' This is clearly the case, since the legally relevant
aggravating and mitigating factors have been shown to only modestly
relate to a death sentence. 12
Given these hurdles, defense attorneys must do what they can in
voir dire to find those jurors who understand the legal requirements for
mitigating evidence and who will respond to a compelling narrative for
a life sentence.2 13 Scholars have suggested that lawyers find more
success with multilayered mitigation strategies that present a complex,
but compelling narrative.21 4 CJP jurors who vote for life almost
consistently brought up the combination of several pieces of mitigation
as significant to their decision, such as a troubled childhood,
alcoholism, mental illness, and a lack of criminal history."' These
jurors observed that the defense was able to personalize and humanize
the defendant, especially when they saw the defendant visibly
responding to mitigation testimony, which provoked jurors' own
feelings of empathy.26 This may be why one scholar suggested that
defense lawyers do what they can to identify the jurors who have had
similar life experiences to the defendant's, but who also have the ability
to empathize with that experience.' 7

210. McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 204 (1971), reh'g granted, judgment
vacated sub nom. Crampton v. Ohio, 408 U.S. 941 (1972).
211. Foglia, supra note 83, at 209. One study concluded the "instructions were
irrelevant" to capital jurors, since their personal feelings about the death penalty did not change
after their service. Id. at 205.
212. Devine & Kelly, supra note 59, at 402.

213. See

SUNDBY,

supra note 61, at 137.

214. Trahan, supra note 45, at 9-10, 14; Barnett et al., supra note 192, at 766 (noting
that a strategy that combined mental health issues, being under the influence of drugs at the
time of the murder, and severe abuse had "significant effects on sentencing outcomes").
215. Trahan, supra note 45, at 10.

216. Id. at 9, 11.
217. Id. at 13. Trahan observes that some jurors with similar backgrounds can be harsher
on a defendant. Id.
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Would This Juror Accept or Deny Responsibility for the
Verdict?

Jurors must not be misled, the Supreme Court has said, "that the
responsibility for sentencing the defendant lay elsewhere." 2 18 Yet many
of them will "use almost any available information to downplay their
responsibility for the death sentencing decision."" They "mislead
themselves;" like one juror said, "I do not feel qualified to make this
decision. I am not a legal expert."220 Jurors pass responsibility for the
sentence onto the prosecutor, the judge, the appellate courts, or even
the law."' They also think of their verdict as a "group" decision instead
of an individual one.?2 Eight of ten CJP jurors deny responsibility for
the punishment and claim the "cover of law," which makes them "more
likely to vote for death." 223
CJP jurors often resent defense attorneys' attempts to make them
feel personally responsible for the death of the person, especially if it
comes across as accusing them of committing murder." As two CJP
jurors explained, the "attorney insulted us" with the tactic and it
"backfired."2 2
Instead, if the lawyer can more subtly convey personal
responsibility, jurors are much less likely to impose a death sentence.22 6
One Colorado Method technique involves reminding jurors that the law
allows them to show mercy for any reason, that they do not have to
justify their decision to other jurors, that each person's vote is
independent of what other jurors decide or what the court or the lawyers

218. Romano v. Oklahoma, 512 U.S. 1, 8 (1994) (citing Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472
U.S. 320, 326 (1985) (plurality opinion)). The Court has "read Caldwell as 'relevant only to
certain types of comment-those that mislead the jury as to its role in the sentencing process
in a way that allows the jury to feel less responsible than it should for the sentencing decision.'
Romano, 512 U.S. at 9 (quoting Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 184 n.15 (1986)).
219. Hoffmann, supra note 137, at 1138; Costanzo & Costanzo, supra note 66, at 162.
220. Hoffmann, supra note 137, at 114243, 1157; Garvey, supra note 80, at 38;
Eisenberg et al., supra note 70, at 368.

221. See Mann v. Dugger, 844 F.2d 1446, 1455 (11th Cir. 1988); Vartkessian, supra
note 82, at 283; Garvey, supra note 80, at 38; Bowers, supra note 58, at 223; Sarat, supranote

90, at 1130.
222. Sherman, supra note 169, at 1245-46.
223. Hoffmann, supra note 137, at 1143-44; Eisenberg et al., supra note 70, at 377;
Bowers, supra note 58, at 223; Garvey, supra note 80, at 38; Sarat, supra note 90, at 1130.
224. Trahan, supra note 45, at 6, 11-12.

225.

ld. at 6.

226. See Sherman, supra note 169, at 1247.
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think, and that all jurors have to respect each juror's opinion.227 This
empowers some jurors to hold fast during deliberations or reminds
others to respect differing opinions. For example, one holdout juror,
who clearly internalized these suggestions, reminded the death voters
that they were "throw[ing] the switch [themselves]" and that "[i]f
[they] say go ahead, that's the same as [if they] are doing it." 2 28
5.

Would This Juror's Life Experience Help Them Empathize with
the Defendant?

Each juror has unique personal attributes such as a race, age, sex,
gender, sexual orientation, personality traits, and maybe religion or
disability, among others. Many of these characteristics have been
shown to affect jurors' votes. However, defense lawyers cannot and
should not simplistically assume jurors vote based on these attributes
in isolation. Jurors' qualities and characteristics intersect in uniquely
individual ways. 22 9 Instead of their individual characteristics in
isolation, it is jurors' life experiences, as filtered through their
attributes, which make them more likely to react in certain ways to the
evidence.
For example, a middle-aged juror of color who grew up in an
underprivileged environment may be more likely to empathize with a
defendant from a similar background. That same juror, however, may
not empathize with the defendant if that juror felt that they were able to
get out of their circumstances through hard work and effort. Thus,
lawyers should not use these categories to stereotype jurors; they
should use them as openings to ask jurors about their experiences and
their opinions. For example, simplistically assuming a Black male juror

227.

Toobin, supra note 7, at 38; Sherman, supra note 169, at 1247; Alan W. Scheflin,

Jury Nullification: The Right to Say No, 45 S. CAL. L. REv. 168 (1972); Paul Butler, Racially
Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal Justice System, 105 YALE L.J. 677
(1995); Darryl K. Brown, Jury Nullification Within the Rule of Law, 81 MINN. L. REV. 1149
(1997).
228. Hoffmann, supra note 137, at 1146.
229. See generally Darrell Steffensmeier et al., Intersectionality of Race, Ethnicity,
Gender, and Age on Criminal Punishment, 60 SoCIo. PERSP. 810 (2017) (analyzing how
individual traits affect decision making); PATRICIA HILL COLLINS & SIRMA BILGE,
INTERSECTIONALITY (2d ed. 2020) (in-depth study of intersectionality); Bandana Purkayastha,
Intersectionalityin a TransnationalWorld, 26 GENDER & Soc'Y 55 (2012) (analyzing various
works on the growing scholarship of intersectionality); Jennifer C. Nash, Re-Thinking
Intersectionalitv, 89 FEMINIST REV. 1 (2008) (analyzing how an individual's identity affects
decision making).
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would sympathize with a defendant, or a white female juror would
sympathize with the victim, the lawyer can instead ask each juror about
their views regarding poverty, or what they think about how
communities of color are treated within the criminal justice system.
They can ask the juror about their experiences with those of other races,
or whether they have religious views about the appropriate punishment
when one commits murder.
a.

Race

Jurors of different races perceive evidence differently." White
jurors, particularly white male jurors, often accept "culturally rooted
racial stereotypes," and tend to view defendants of color- especially
Black males-as criminogenically violent, dangerous, and more
deserving of the death penalty."' White jurors are significantly more
likely to undervalue, disregard, and even use mitigating evidence
against Black defendants. 232 They tend think the system is too lenient
toward or works to benefit communities of color,2 33 that defendants of

230.

Brewer, supra note 70, at 539-43; Connell, supra note 71, at

172.

231. william J. Bowers et al., CrossingRacial Boundaries:A CloserLook at the Roots
of Racial Bias in CapitalSentencing When the Defendant is Black and the Victim Is White, 53
DEPAUL L. REv. 1497, 1531-32 (2004); Bowers et al., supra note 117, at 451-52; Bowers et
al., supra note 109, at 179, 219; Eisenberg et al., supra note 68, at 277; Jamie L. Flexon,
Cognitive Predisposition to Prejudice and Discrimination on Capital Juries: Can Race Be
Ignored in the Jury Room? 91-93, 118 (2006) (Ph.D. dissertation, State University of New

York at Albany); Marian J. Borg, Vicarious Homicide Victimization and Supportfor Capital
Punishment: A Test of Black's Theory of'Law, 36 CRIMINOLOGY 537, 547-49, 562-63 (1998);
Steven E. Barkan & Steven F. Cohn, Racial Prejudiceand Supportfor the Death Penalty by
Whites, 31 J. RSCH. CRIME & DELINQ. 202, 205-06 (1994); Steven F. Cohn et al., Punitive
Attitudes Toward Criminals: Racial Consensus or Racial Conflict?, 38 Soc. PROBS. 287, 294
(1991); Michael Sunnafrank & Norman E. Fontes, General and Crime Related Racial
Stereotypes and Influence on Juridic Decisions, 17 CORNELL J. Soc. RELS. 1 (1983); see also
Amy Farrell et al., Juror Perceptions of the Legitimacy of Legal Authorities and Decision
Making in Criminal Cases, 38 L. & Soc. INQuIRY 773, 795 (2013) (finding that white jurors
are more likely to vote for guilt against Black defendants on the first ballot). We use an
"invisible cultural lens" to make quick, and often superstitious judgments about others. Susan
Bryant, The Five Habits: BuildingCross-CulturalCompetence in Lawyers, 8 CLNICAL L. REv.

33, 40 (2001).
232. Lynch & Haney, supra note 117, at 353.
233. Brewer, supra note 70, at 53940; EDELMAN, supra note 118, at 4; Bowers et al.,
supra note 109, at 180.
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color lie,23 4 and that a defendant of color is not remorseful. 235 They
often have strong negative reactions to the defendant and make little, if
any, attempt to understand the circumstances of their life.23 6
Nearly two-thirds of white jurors cast their first vote for death,
compared to one-third of Black jurors. 2 37 These jurors justify their
preconceived biases about people of color with invalid and irrelevant
justifications. 238 White males, in particular, so strongly insist on death
sentences that researchers refer to it as the "'[w]hite male dominance'
effect." 23 9
Conversely, jurors of color tend to be more critical of the state's
case, less likely to convict a defendant, and much more receptive to
mitigation evidence.2 40 This is because many people of color have a
"shared experience of discrimination in formal and informal law
enforcement settings." 24 1 These jurors' experiences make them much
more likely to sympathetically view what the state calls "aggravating"
evidence, such as a troubled childhood, a criminal history, or run-ins
with law enforcement.242

HARV. L. REV.
Detection, and
Lie
Race,
Gap:
The
Demeanor
Rand,
w.
Joseph
see
also
1261, 1294 (2000);
the Jury, 33 CONN. L. REV. 1, 72-76 (2000) (noting issues with cross-racial lie detection).
235. Bowers et al., supra note 109, at 192-93, 212-22.
236. Garvey, supra note 80, at 46-47.
237. Eisenberg et al., supra note 68, at 286.
238. Bowers et al., supranote 109, at 212, 218, 226, 241-42; Ted Chiricos et al., Racial

234. Kim Taylor-Thompson, Empty Votes in Jury Deliberations, 113

Typification of Crime and Support fbr Punitive Measures, 42

CRIMINOLOGY

359, 378-80

(2004); Brewer, supra note 70, at 532; Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, How Much
Do We Really Know about Race andJuries?A Review of Social Science Theory andResearch,
78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 997, 1007 (2003); Steven E. Barkan & Steven F. Cohn, Why Whites
Favor Spending More Money to Fight Crime: The Role of Racial Prejudice, 52 SOc. PROBS.

300, 307 (2005).
239.
240.

Devine & Kelly, supra note 59, at 395; Bowers et al., supra note 109, at 192.
Bowers et al., supra note 109, at 181; Brewer, supra note 70, at 539; Tanya E.

Coke, Lady JusticeMay Be Blind, but Is She a Soul Sister? Race-Neutrality and the Ideal of
RepresentativeJuries, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 327, 355 (1994).
241. Bowers et al., supra note 109, at 180, 242.
242. Id. at 196 & 196 nn. 11, 201, 211; Brewer, supra note 70, at 539; Lawrence D.
Bobo & Devon Johnson, A Tastefor Punishment: Black and White Americans' Views on the
Death Penalty and the War on Drugs, 1 DU Bois REV. SOc. SC. RscH. RACE 151, 156 (2004)
(noting "substantial differences" in how white and Black jurors view police, prosecutors,
courts, and punishment); Coke, supra note 240, at 351-60 (explaining how white jurors have
limited, and mostly positive interactions with police, while the experiences of people of color
tend to be negative); see Frank Tuerkheimer, Forum, The Rodney King Verdict: Why and

Where to from Here?, 1992 Wis. L. REV. 849, 849 (1992).
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Jurors of color are much less likely to impose death sentences.243
Jurors of color differ from white jurors in how they perceive the
system's legitimacy and its potential for error, in their views of the
defendant's culpability and remorse, in their empathy toward the
defendant, and in their willingness to be merciful.2" They simply are
more likely to question the government's case and separate the crime
from the person accused. 245
Black jurors "are significantly more receptive to mitigation than
their white counterparts and more receptive overall," especially when
the defendant is Black.2 46 In fact, one study found that Black jurors
were generally more receptive to mitigation evidence no matter the
defendant's race, including for white defendants. 247 If even one Black
male juror serves on a capital jury, the chances of obtaining a death
sentence plummet from 71.9% to 42.9%.248 This has been called a
"'Black male presence' effect." 249 Conversely, only 30% of cases
resulted in a death sentence if four or fewer white men sat on a jury but
rose to 70.7% if five or more white men sat.2 5 0
All too often, "Black jurors see mitigation where whites see
aggravation." 51 In one South Carolina case, white jurors thought a
Black defendant lacked (and even. faked) emotion when he and his
mother pled for his life, which they claimed justified a death
sentence. 25 2 But a Black male juror differently thought the defendant
"seemed sorry" and the juror regretted succumbing to the other jurors'
desire for a death sentence. 253
In a Pennsylvania case, one Black male juror felt white jurors had
automatically decided to give the death penalty because the defendant

243.

David C. Baldus et al., The Use of Peremptory Challenges in Capital Murder

Trials: A Legal and EmpiricalAnalysis, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 3, 124 (2001); Devine & Kelly,
supra note 59, at 400; Eisenberg et al., supra note 68, at 279; Eisenberg et al., supra note 88,
at 385; see Brewer, supra note 70, at 531.
244. Bowers et al., supra note 109, at 180,207-11,216-18,241-42; Bowers et al., supra
note 231, at 1531-32; Bowers et al., supra note 117, at 451-52.
245. Garvey, supra note 80, at 47.
246. Brewer, supra note 70, at 539, 542; Brewer, supra note 155, at 359.
247. Brewer, supra note 70, at 539-40.
248. Bowers et al., supra note 109, at 193; SUNDBY, supranote 61, at 151.
249. Devine & Kelly, supra note 59, at 395.
250. Bowers et al., supra note 109, at 193-94.

251. Id. at 258.
252. Id. at 248.
253. Id. at 248-50.
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was Black.2 54 When other Black jurors tried to help them sympathize
with the defendant's upbringing, including being abandoned by his
mother, abused by his father, and growing up in crack houses, the white
jurors were surprisingly disinterested and callous.255 "[T]hey were
more concerned about what we were gonna have for lunch and how
long was lunch and when we were gonna get out of here." 2 6
One of the two Black jurors in a Florida case said that white jurors
simply wanted to impose the death penalty because the Black
defendants killed a white police officer.257 "I felt like they didn't give a
shit one way or the other. They wanted to go to the football game and
they wanted to go home to their husbands and all this type of stuff, and
not worry about whether these people were gonna die or not. " 25 A
white female juror confirmed that jurors thought the mitigation
evidence was "hysterical" and that it was "difficult not to laugh" at it 259
They just "wanted to go home." 260
Some multivariate studies have concluded a juror's race does not
significantly predict a sentencing outcome.2 61 This may be because race
plays little to no role in most juries' outward discussions, but operates
instead at the individual level, both consciously and unconsciously. 262
Defense lawyers should first try to ensure that jury venire panels
do not skew heavily, as the research shows they do, toward white
jurors.23 They should also try to keep the prosecution from making
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.

Id. at 246.
See id. at 246-48.
Id. at 247.
Id. at 244-45.
Id. at 245.
Id. at 246.
Id.

261. Connell, supra note 71, at 172; Devine & Kelly, supra note 59, at 402.
262. Brewer, supra note 70, at 543; Connell, supra note 71, at 172; Devine & Kelly,
supra note 59, at 402-03; Bowers et al., supra note 109, at 195, 264; Flexon, supra note 231,
at 2-5 (explaining that stereotype influence happens at the subconscious level often related to
race-biased media exposure).
263. Noelle Nasif et al., RacialExclusion andDeath Penalty Juries:Can Death Penalty
Juries Ever Be Representative?, 27 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 147, 147-52, 158-59 (2018);
EDELMAN, supra note 118, at 3; Robert Fitzgerald & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Due Process vs.
Crime Control: Death Qualification and Jury Attitudes, 8 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 31, 46 (1984);

Illegal RacialDiscriminationin Jury Selection, supra note 112, at 4-6; Mona Lynch & Craig
Haney, Mapping the Racial Bias of the White Male CapitalJuror:Jury Composition and the
"Empathic Divide," 45 L. & Soc'Y REV. 69, 73 (2011). "American jury systems tend to
overrepresent white, middle-aged, suburban, middle-class people and underrepresent other
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race-based juror strikes to select an all or a mostly white jury.2 64
Defense lawyers should proactively seek to seat a diverse jury,
especially when representing defendants of color.16 1
However, defense counsel should not engage in "racial, ethnic, or
gender stereotyping" or make race-based strikes.2 66 Race alone "is not
a reliable proxy for a more meaningful inquiry into a person's
groups in our society." 1 Jurywork: Systematic Techniques § 5:2 (2020). Additionally, "many
lawyers and judges still tend to view whites as presumptively impartial" while people of color,
in contrast, "are seen as self-interested." Coke, supra note 240, at 347; id. ("[T]he baseline of
neutrality is defined in white, middle-class terms.").

264. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 100 (1986); Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42,
59 (1992); Georgia v. Carr, 506 U.S. 801 (1992). G. Ben Cohen & Robert J. Smith, The Death
ofDeath-Qualification,59 CASE W. RSRV. L. REv. 87, 122 (2008) (finding that Black jurors
are disproportionately excluded based on their disfavor of the death penalty); see Coke, supra

note 240, at 327-29.
265. Coke, supra note 240, at 331; id. ("Mixed race juries help to vindicate the
defendant's interests in a fair trial and the courts' interest in promoting thorough, unbiased
adjudications."). The Court has explicitly prohibited striking a juror based on race. McCollum,
505 U.S. at 59; Carr, 506 U.S. 801. However, a plurality of the Court admitted a "special
seriousness" of a "risk of racial prejudice" among capital jurors. Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S.
28, 36, 36 n.8, 12 (1986); id. at 35 (finding that the wide range of juror discretion presents "a
unique opportunity for racial prejudice to operate but remain undetected").
There are compelling reasons for defendants of color to strike white jurors whose
"dignitary interest" in sitting on a jury pales in comparison to the constitutional right of a
defendant of color to equal protection and to a fair and unbiased jury. Id. at 33148; Sarma,
supra note 125, at 920-21 & 921 n.55; John J. Francis, Peremptory Challenges, Grutter, and
CriticalMass: A Means of Reclaiming the Promise ofBatson, 29 VT. L. REv. 297, 337 (2005);
Nancy J. King, PostconvictionReview of JuryDiscrimination:Measuringthe Effects ofJuror
Race on Jury Decisions, 92 MiCH. L. REv. 63, 111 n.185 (1993). The defense has an obligation
to challenge and check state power and should use the peremptory to mitigate racial bias.
Smith, supra note 112, at 1175-76 & 1175 n.84; Douglas L. Colbert, Challenging the
Challenge: Thirteenth Amendment as a ProhibitionAgainst the Racial Use of Peremptory
Challenges, 76 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 100 (1990); Stephen A. Saltzburg & Mary Ellen Powers,
Peremptory Challenges and the Clash Between Impartiality and Group Representation, 41
MD. L. REv. 337, 341 (1982). Defendants of color also have little ability to entirely remove
white jurors from the pool, whereas the government can easily do this with jurors of color.
Coke, supra note 240, at 344-45; JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY: THE JURY SYSTEM AND
THE IDEAL OF DEMOCRACY : WITH A NEW PREFACE xxiv (2000). Arguably, Grutterv. Bollinger,

539 U.S. 306 (2003) justifies using race as a "plus factor" among a multifactor analysis for the
compelling state interest in achieving a diverse jury panel. Sarma, supranote 125, at 921 n.55;
Francis, supra, at 359-63; Phoebe A. Haddon, Does Grutter Offer Courts an Opportunity to
Consider Race in Juy Selection and Decisions Related to Promoting Fairness in the
Deliberation Process, 13 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REv. 547, 552-54 (2004); see also Batson,
476 U.S. at 87-88 (commenting on how discrimination injury selection hinders justice); J.E.B.
v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 140 (1994) (explaining the harms from selection procedures that
exclude jurors of color).
266. Smith, supra note 112, at 1175.
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experience and attitudes." 26 7 Instead, lawyers should evaluate jurors'
life experiences "with race in mind," recognizing that it is ultimately a
juror's receptivity to mitigation that matters.268 The "diversity in
perspective" of people of color simply helps them understand
aggravation and mitigation differently and more empathically than the
perspectives and life experiences of most white jurors.269
When the jury is racially diverse, all jurors become less confident
in the defendant's guilt, are less hostile, more lenient, deliberate longer,
more carefully assess the evidence, and are more likely to vote for
life.2 70 Jurors of color can helpfully "translate" or culturally explain the
evidence from a defendant's life that white jurors perceive as
aggravating.2 7 Black male jurors especially can provide a distinct and
powerful perspective that has been shown to be "especially effective"
at countering the pro-death positions of white jurors.2 2

267. Id.; see also Abbe Smith, "Nice Work If You Can Get It ": "Ethical"Juy Selection
in Criminal Defense, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 523, 547 (1998) (stating that although race may
impact jury selection, race is only one factor among many); Coke, supra note 240, at 359
(explaining that while a juror's race should not be the factor, "it is a potential predictor of sociocultural experience and attitudes").
268. Smith, supra note 112, at 1169 ("If race matters in society, it should matter to
criminal lawyers."); see Devine & Kelly, supra note 59, at 402-03. Both Abbe Smith and
Alafair S. Burke have argued that prosecutors' higher obligations should make them forgo
peremptory challenges or use them to make a jury more "reflective of the broader community."
Smith, supra note 112, at 1169-71; Alafair S. Burke, Prosecutorsand Peremptories,97 IowA
L. REV. 1467, 1474-76, 1488 (2012).
269. Connell, supra note 71, at 172-73.
270. Sommers, supra note 120, at 597; Tabak, supra note 118, at 260-61 (noting that
"study after study" confirms these effects); Sommers & Ellsworth, supra note 238, at 1028;
Sarma, supra note 125, at 911; Sommers & Ellsworth, supranote 113, at 221 (arguing that the
inclusion of Black jurors influences jurors to adopt "egalitarian values" and "make[s] bias less
likely"); Bowers et al., supra note 109, at 187; see Nasif et al., supra note 263, at 148, 161-62.
Burt Neuborne explains that a diverse jury assures that the mix of facts found reflects "the
varying assumptions and predispositions" of "people of widely differing cultural and
experiential backgrounds." Burt Neuborne, Of Sausage Factoriesand Syllogism Machines:

Formalism, Realism, and Exclusionary Selection Techniques, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 419, 432
(1992).
271. Taylor-Thompson, supra note 234, at 1285; SUNDBY, supra note 61, at 152. Even
so, "[p]lacing the responsibility for guarding against discriminatory verdicts on a few minority
jurors is as unfair to those jurors as it is to defendants." Susan N. Herman, Why the Court Loves
Batson: Representation-Reinforcement. Colorblindness, and the Juy, 67 TUL. L. REV. 1807,

1845 (1993).
272. These conversations often involve "tension, conflict, and hostility across racial
lines." Bowers et al., supra note 109, at 195-96, 202.
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As I argued earlier, defense attorneys must find out what jurors
think on these issues.273 The importance here is to have open and honest
conversations, and as much as possible, to help identify and rate those
jurors who will unfairly make racially biased judgments as well as
those who would be more likely to understand and to empathize with
the defendant's case.
b.

Sex and Age

Generally speaking, male jurors of all ages, excepting males
younger than thirty, vote for the death penalty at much higher rates than
women.27 4 Women are likely to holdout for life sentences, but also tend
to succumb to pressure and change their votes.275 Nearly 82% of female
CJP jurors reported regretting their vote. 276
Sometimes female jurors impose harsher sentences on male
defendants, but studies have not fully explained these differences. 277
273. Smith, supra note 112, at 1175 (arguing that attorneys should focus on uncovering
and identifying prospective jurors' biases and make cause-based challenges); Tabak, supra
note 118, at 264 ("[D]efense counsel may want the jury to include people who talk honestly
about their views about race rather than denying that they have any racial attitudes."). As
several social psychologists argued, by making people aware of discrepancies between
conscious ideals and sometimes unconscious negative responses, the lawyer can "take
advantage of the genuinely good intentions of aversive racists to motivate them to gain the
experiences they need to unlearn one set of responses and learn the new set that they desire."
Dovidio et al., supra note 123, at 535; Rapping, supra note 109, at 1021-22.
274. Phoebe C. Ellsworth & Samuel R. Gross, Hardeningof the Attitudes: Americans'
Views on the Death Penalty, 50 J. SOC. IsSUES 19, 21 (1994); Eisenberg et al., supra note 68,
at 277; Brewer, supra note 70, at 539 (noting that female jurors are consistently more receptive
to mitigation than male jurors); Monica K. Miller & R. David Hayward, Religious
Characteristicsand the Death Penalty, 32 L. & HuM. BEHAV. 113, 117 (2008) (finding gender
more predictive than age or race); Borg, supra note 231, at 549, 554-55, 559 (finding these
trends); Fox et al., supra note 53, at 503, 518-19 (finding older Republican married males with
children the most likely supporters of the death penalty); Crystal M. Beckham et al., Jurors'
Locus of Control and Defendants' Attractiveness in Death Penalty Sentencing, 147 J. Soc.
PsycH. 285, 285, 293-94 (2007) (showing that younger women are also more likely than older
women to vote for death).
275. Heather Pruss, The Role of Juror and Jury Gender during Capital Deliberations: A
Guided Qualitative Analysis (Dec. 2014) (Ph.D. dissertation, Indiana University).
276. Michael E. Antonio, Stress and the CapitalJury: How Male and Female Jurors
React to Serving on a Murder Trial,29 JUST. SYS. J. 396, 399-401 (2008); Michael E. Antonio,
I Didn't Know It'd Be So Hard:Jurors'Emotional Reactions to Serving on a CapitalTrial, 89
JUDICATURE 282, 284-88 (2006).
277. Karl L. wuensch et al., Effects of PhysicalAttractiveness, Sex, and Type of Crime
on Mock Juror Decisions: A Replication with Chinese Students, 24 J. CROSS-CULTURAL
PSYCH. 414,422-25 (1993); Beckham et al., supra note 274, at 295. One study found that juries
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One study found that equal male/female juries were more likely to vote
for death, but that female-majority juries "were significantly less likely
to decide in favor of death." 2 78 Female CJP jurors have been
"consistently more receptive to mitigation than their male
counterpart[s]." 279 This could be because men tend to talk more than
women, interrupt others, and control and dominate the discussion,
while women in general tend instead to seek compromise and
understanding. 280
People in their late teens and early twenties tend to vote for life;
death sentences peak in middle age, then decline rapidly as the person
ages past their forties.2 81Young men similar in age to the defendant tend
to impose a more lenient sentence. 282 However, one study found that
"gender had much less effect on jury sentencing behavior than did race
and age." 283
c.

Religious Beliefs

Some jurors' religious beliefs affect their sentencing decisions.
Jurors have said that "God guided [them]" to impose a death sentence,
believing, as another juror thought, that they must follow God by
"simply demand[ing] death when a life had been deliberately taken." 284
Some jurors' "favorite explanation" for the death penalty is "an eye for
an eye." 2 s Researchers have found that jurors with "angry and
judgmental images of God" have the most punitive attitudes regarding

composed of eight or more women had a slightly higher death-sentencing rate, but it lacked
statistical significance. Baldus et al., supra note 243, at 124-25.
278. Tara N. Richards et al., Predictorsof Death Sentencingfor Minority. Equal, and
Majority Female Juries in CapitalMurder Trials, 26 WOMEN & CRIM. JUST. 260, 273 (2016).
279. Brewer, supra note 70, at 539.
280. Bowers et al., supra note 109, at 195 n.110; John E. Baird, Jr., Sex Differences in
Group Communication: A Review of Relevant Research, 62 Q.J. SPEECH 179, 181 (1976);
Connell, supra note 71, at 170-71; see DEBORAH TANNEN, YOU JUST DON'T UNDERSTAND:
WOMEN AND MEN TN CONVERSATION 24-25 (2013).

281.

Beckham et al., supra note 274, 291-95.

282.

Jd. at 295.

283.
284.
69, at 44.
285.

Baldus et al., supra note 243, at 124-25.
Hoffmann, supra note 137, at 1148-49, 1154; Geimer & Amsterdam, supra note
Gross, supra note 154, at 1451-52.
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the death penalty.2 6 They have also found that white, not Black, male
fundamentalist Christians have the strongest pro-death views.2 8 2
Many Christian jurors, particularly Biblical literalists, have been
taught to support the death penalty and will vote for it.28 8 In one study,
nearly 80% of Southern Baptists (almost all of whom were white)
voted for death, compared to about 50% of other denominations. 289
d.

Personality Traits

Extraverted and conscientious people are more likely to favor the
death penalty, while people who are open to experience and agreeable
are less likely to support it. 290 Jurors who prioritize internal motivation
and hard work tend to attribute crime to a lack of self-control, and are
more likely to discount mitigating evidence and vote for death.291 As
one juror argued, "okay, maybe he was abused ... but he should have
been able to turn his life around over time." 292

286.

Christopher D. Bader et al., Divine Justice: The Relationship Between Images of

God and Attitudes Toward CriminalPunishment, 35 CR1 M. JUST. REv. 90, 90 (2010).
287.

Chester L. Britt, Race, Religion, and Support./or the Death Penalty: A Research

Note, 15 JUST. Q. 175, 175, 183-90 (1998); Harold G. Grasmick et al., Religion, Punitive
Justice, and Supportfor the Death Penalty, 10 JUST. Q. 289, 301-10 (1993); Harold G.
Grasmick et al., Religious Beliefs and Public Supportfor the Death Penaltyfor Juveniles and
Adults, 16 J. CRIME JUST. 59, 74 (1993); Robert L. Young, Religious Orientation, Race and
Supportfor the DeathPenalty, 31 J. Sci. STUDY RELIGION 76, 79, 82-85 (1992); James Davison

Hunter, Religion and PoliticalCivility: The Coming Generationof American Evangelicals, 23
J. SCI. STUDY RELIGION 364, 369 (1984); Borg, supra note 231, at 548-49; Miller & Hayward,
supra note 274, at 118.
288. Young, supra note 287, at 76; Borg, supra note 231, at 548-49; Miller & Hayward,
supra note 274, at 117; see Bader et al., supra note 286, at 99. Jerry Falwell once wrote, "the
Bible clearly teaches capital punishment for capital crimes, to protect the intrinsic value of a
person's right to life." Jerry Falwell, Capital Punishment for Capital Crimes,
1 FUNDAMENTALIST J. 8, 8 (1982).
289. Eisenberg et al., supra note 68, at 279, 286.

290. Monica Robbers, Tough-Mindedness and Fair Play: Personality Traits as
Predictors of Attitudes Toward the Death Penalty-an Exploratory Gendered Study, 8
PUNISHMENT & Soc'Y 203, 211 (2006).
291. Beckham et al., supranote 274, at 286-87; SUNDBY, supra note 61, at 149; Osborne
et al., supra note 129, 344-48; Richard A. Stevick et al., Locus of Control and Behavioral
Versus Self Response Measures of Social Interest, 36 J. INDIVIDUAL PSYCH. 183, 188 (1980);

Julian B. Rotter, Generalized Expectancies for Internal Versus External Control of
Reinforcement, 80 PSYCH. MONOGRAPHS GEN. & APPLIED 1, 25 (1966).
292. SUNDBY, supra note 61, at 149.
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Other jurors process the world externally, attributing a person's
behavior to experiences outside their control. 293 These jurors are much
less likely to find a defendant guilty, and tend to sympathize with
mitigating evidence and vote for life.294 These are the jurors who, as
one juror related, "kept insisting that [they] look at the childhood" and
who made "compassionate speeches" reminding the other jurors that
the defendant was also a victim who had been shaped by his life
circumstances. 29
e.

The Importance of Empathy

From the crime through the trial, the government will relentlessly
emphasize "the ferocity and monstrosity of the crime" well before the
defense can respond.2 96 Between most jurors and the defendant is an
unavoidable "cultural chasm." 2 97 That is why attorneys must use voir
dire find jurors whose life experiences will help them to bridge the gap
so that they can relate to and understand the defendant. 29 Jurors do not
fit in simplistic categorical boxes. Consequently, defense attorneys
must get to know them and try to exclude those who simply will not
get it, who will not understand the defendant, and they must do their
Lyn Y. Abramson et al., Learned Helplessness in Humans: Critique and
PSYCH. 49, 54 (1978); Beckham et al., supra note 274, at 287.
294. Jacqueline Pope & Robert Meyer, An AttributionalAnalysis ofJurors'Judgements
in a Criminal Case: A PreliminaryInvestigation, 27 SOC. BEHAv. & PERSONALITY 563, 565,
569-73 (1999); Beckham et al., supra note 274, at 287; Osborne et al., supra note 129, at 340;
see Richard izzett & Leslie Fishman, Defendant Sentences as a Function ofAttractiveness and
Justijication/or Actions, 100 J. SOC. PSYCH. 285, 288-89 (1976); SUNDRY, supra note 61, at
293.

Reformulation, 87 J. ABNORMAL

141-43.
295. SUNDBY, supra note 61, at 149-50.
296. Ghoshray, supra note 130, at 494.
297. Sarma, supra note 125, at 913; id. at 927 ("[T]he more cultural distance there is
between a prospective juror and a defendant, the less likely it is that that juror will vote for a
life sentence in the penalty phase."); see Brewer, supra note 70, at 533. Others have called this
a "psychological barrier" or an "empathic divide." Ghoshray, supra note 130, at 485, 491-506;
CRAIG HANEY, DEATH BY DESIGN: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AS A SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL

SYSTEM, in AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGY LAW SOCIETY SERIES 203 (Ronald Roesch ed., 2005); see
also Haney, supra note 162, at 1463 (describing the impact of cultural differences on capital
sentencing); Rozelle, supra note 157, at 785 (noting that capital juries do not "reflect the myriad
backgrounds, experiences, and perspectives of a jury of one's peers").
298. Brewer, supra note 70, at 532; Thomas W. Brewer, Don't Kill My Friend: the
Attorney-Client Relationship in Capital Cases and Its Effect on Jury Receptivity to Mitigation
Evidence 22-23, 31-35 (2003) (Ph.D. dissertation, University at Albany, State University of
New York) (on file with author); Russell Stetler, The Past, Present, and Future of the

MitigationProfession: Fulfillingthe ConstitutionalRequirement of Individualized Sentencing
in Capital Cases, 46 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1161, 1171 (2018).
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best to choose jurors who can understand the defendant's story and
especially those who can empathize with it.
6.

How Does This Juror View Expert Testimony?

Defense attorneys must approach the use of paid expert witnesses
with great caution since capital jurors view them as hired guns who are
paid to, as one juror put it, "say whatever you want them to say."299
Even worse, because jurors do not often understand expert testimony,
they reject it entirely.300 One juror explained that the defense's "socalled expert" tried to get them to ignore their own perceptions, which
"failed so miserably" because jurors "felt manipulated."30 1 She called
the choice to call an expert "an incredible, blatant stupidity on their
part." 30 2 In one CJP study, two-thirds of jurors felt defense experts
backfired or were hard to believe and only a fifth of jurors saw experts
making positive contributions to the case.30 3 The same biases do not
occur with government experts, because jurors see them as salaried
professionals who have little interest in manipulating their testimony.304
The mirror opposite finding comes from family members and
friends who testify for the defense. Jurors tend to see them much more
positively because they have no financial incentive to testify.30 5
To counter these problems, as Scott Sundby suggests, defense
lawyers should only use an expert as "an accompanist who is there to
help the jury understand the other evidence that they have heard during
the trial," particularly to highlight aspects of the family members'

299.

SUNDBY, supranote 61, at 145; Scott E. Sundby, The Jury as Critic:An Empirical

Look at How CapitalJuries Perceive Expert and Lay Testimony, 83 VA. L. REv. 1109, 1115,
1127-28 (1997).
300.

Dale A. Nance & Scott B. Morris, Juror Understanding of DNA Evidence: An

Empirical Assessment of PresentationFormatsfor Trace Evidence with a Relatively Small
Random-Match Probability,34 J. LEGAL STUD. 395, 434 (2005); see Sundby, supra note 299,
at 1132-34. "Jurors expressly stated that they ignored the testimony of experts when it differed
significantly from their preconceived notions of a phenomenon." Krauss & Sales, supra note

85, at 276.
301. Sundby, supra note 299, at 1134.
302. Id.
303. Id. at 1123. One study found mock jurors better related to and supported clinical
expert testimony as opposed to actuarial expert testimony. Krauss & Sales, supra note 85, at

90.
304.

Sundby, supra note 299, at 1128-29.

305. Id. at 1124.
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testimony in a way that is not "excessively complex." 306 If they plan to
use expert testimony, defense counsel must carefully assess and rank
jurors on this issue.
7.

Is the Juror Likely to Harbor Doubt About the Defendant's

Guilt?
One of the most powerful reasons jurors vote for life is
"continuing uncertainty" about the defendant's guilt. 307 In one study,
69% of Florida capital jurors indicated that the major reason they voted
for life was because they had doubt about the defendant's guilt. 308
According to one multivariate regression analysis, "lingering doubt
about guilt was associated with a 94% lower likelihood of death."3 0 9
While this situation "is not particularly common," it appears to be
"influential when it exists." 310
This is incredibly difficult to handle pretrial, since it only arises in
the innocence case. In one study, nine of ten CJP jurors strongly
resented defense efforts to question the verdict during the penalty
phase, which led the authors to suggest attorneys avoid this strategy
unless they feel jurors are "second-guessing their guilt[y] verdict.""'
Perhaps in voir dire, lawyers can encourage jurors to vote not
guilty and to avoid saving those doubts for sentencing. But many jurors
might negotiate a guilty verdict to extract a life sentence concession
from death-prone jurors. That is no consolation in the innocence case.
There are no easy answers. If necessary, especially in the guilt case,
counsel should explore the issue with jurors and rank them on their
likelihood to fit in this category.

306. SuNDBY, supra note 61, at 145; Sundby, supra note 299, at 1115, 1124-25; Krauss
& Sales, supra note 85, at 276; Trahan, supra note 45, at 12.
307. Devine & Kelly, supra note 59, at 403; Garvey, supra note 68, at 1563 (finding
that 77.2% ofjurors with lingering doubts were less likely to impose a death sentence); Trahan,
supra note 45, at 11. One study found that Black jurors were much more likely than white
jurors to have lingering doubts about guilt affect their punishment decisions. Bowers et al.,
supra note 117, at 451-52; Bowers et al., supra note 109, at 232.
308. Geimer & Amsterdam, supra note 69, at 27-28.
309. Devine & Kelly, supra note 59, at 401.

310. Id. at 403.
311. Trahan, supra note 45, at 5, 11. Trahan concluded, "mitigation strategies that
focused on raising doubts as to the defendants' guilt were generally ineffectual." Id. at 11.
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How Will This Juror Perceive Defense Counsel?

The credibility of the defendant's case often hinges on how jurors
relate to defense counsel. They watch attorneys from the outset,
scrutinizing the lawyer's words and actions to determine whether they
are trustworthy.312

Jurors' evaluation starts in voir dire. 313 When lawyers think, "'I've
got to find the bad people and get rid of them'-that permeates the
atmosphere. The jurors pick up on an adversarial tone and will see you
more as someone who has something to sell than someone who is
interested in what they think." 314 Defense lawyer Gerry Spence
explained that jurors can easily see beneath the fake smile and
friendliness that the lawyer wants to kick them off the jury, and no one
"want[s] to be rejected . . . Rejection is pain."31 s
Instead, jurors respond better when attorneys try to "get to know
[the jurors] as human beings and let them know [them as attorneys].""
One method offered by the Trial Lawyers College (TLC) is "predicated
on building a relationship between the lawyer and the juror."3 1
Attorneys do not pick a jury; instead, they build "a tribe-a comnunity
312. Trahan, supra note 58, at 180; Antonio, supra note 68, at 224-26. One law
professor wrote that "[d]efense counsel must be aware that his manner of interacting with his
client expresses his estimation of his client and conveys to the judge or jury how they in turn
should value the defendant." Gary Goodpaster, The Trialfor Life: Effective Assistance of
Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 299, 321 (1983).

313. See To Win the Trial, You Must Win the Trust of the Juy. An Interview with Paco
Duarte, WA Regional Faculty Co Leader Voir Dire Seminar at Sleeping Lady, TRIAL LAWS.
COLL. SUCCESS STORIES (Feb. 19, 2016), https://www.triallawyerscollege.org/blog/to-win-thetrial-you-must-win-the-trust-of-the-jury-an-interview-with-paco-duarte-wa-regional-facultyco-leader-voir-dire-seminar-at-sleeping-lady/ [https://perma.cc/93RJ-w56G] [hereinafter To

Win the Trial].
314.

The Power of Conversation During Voir Dire An Interview with Connie

Henderson, Voir Dire Seminar: WA Regional Faculty Co Leader, TRIAL LAWS. COLL.
SUCCESS STORIES (Feb. 10, 2016), https://www.triallawyerscollege.org/blog/the-power-ofconversation-during-voir-di re-an-interview-with-connie-henderson-voir-dire-seminar-waregional-faculty-co-leader/ [https://perma.cc/6GJR-D6DU].
315. Lepir, supra note 24, at 399-400.
316. My belief that the Juy that will always save you .. . An Interview with Steve Fury,
2006 Grad and Voir Dire: WA Regional Faculty Co Leader, TRIAL LAWS. COLL. SUCCESS
STORIES (Feb. 3, 2016), https://www.triallawyerscollege.org/blog/my-belief-that-the-jurythat-will-always-save-you-an-interview-with-steve-fury-2006-grad-and-voir-dire-waregional-faculty-co-leader/ [https://perma.cc/2WND-EA47].
317. Lepir, supra note 24, at 398. Training in this method costs $1,699 for the most
recent seminar. Washington Regional Seminar 2020: Voir Dire, TRIAL LAWS. COLL.,
https://www.triallawyerscollege.org/course-listing/washington-regional-seminar-2020-voir-

dire/ [https://perma.cc/9TUQ-4LGF].
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of people who work together to resolve a real human problem in a way
that will be just and fair." 318 As one lawyer reflected, he worked "to
respect and trust jurors" and "be thankful, genuinely thankful," that
they would take time to listen to the case, particularly since they were
the client's only chance for justice:
[We have] to hear, really hear, the juror; to understand the juror; to be
grateful for the juror's honesty, even when it is terrifying; to share
honestly with them as we engage them in conversation; and to be
ourselves. In turn, jurors reciprocate our candor and effort with trust and
with their willingness to listen to us.319

This might require lawyers to "radically tell[] the truth," as one capital
defense attorney explained, such as revealing the lawyer's own biases
or even admitting to the flaws in the case. 32o
Jurors strongly dislike "sales pitches," theatrics, flippancy, and
hostile or aggressive tactics, especially if they feel the attorney is trying
to limit the truth or control the witness.321 These attitudes have
consequences. One capital juror felt that because defense counsel
"didn't try enough" it "affected the jury" so that they "had less
sympathy" for the defendant. 2
On the other hand, jurors tend to trust defense attorneys who
"modeled a close relationship with their clients," which increased
jurors' receptivity to mitigating evidence by 66.3%.323 Lawyers cannot
do this unless they get out of the office and get to know their clients,
their families, so that they can sincerely communicate that they carebecause they actually do.32 4 It will not be an act; it will be what the
lawyer really feels. 2 5 If the lawyer does not really care for the client,
jurors react quite negatively and view counsel as manipulative because

318. To Win the Trial, supra note 313.
319. Id.
320. Story-Telling That Saves Lives: TLC Grads Jake Watson and Brian White Save
Their Clientfrom the Death Penalty, TRIAL LAWS. COLL. SUCCESS STORIES (Jan. 20, 2016),
https://www.triallawyerscollege.org/blog/story-telling-that-saves-lives-tlc-grads-jake-watsonand-brian-white-save-their-client-from-the-death-penalty/ [https://perma.cc/DY5S-RSPP]

[hereinafter Story-Telling That Saves Lives].
321.
322.
323.
324.

SUNDBY, supra note 61, at 166; Trahan, supra note 58, at 170-71, 175, 178-79.

Geimer & Amsterdam, supra note 69, at 53.
Trahan, supra note 58, at 179; Brewer, supra note 155, at 356.
Story-Telling That Saves Lives, supra note 320.
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they can see the lack of relationship between the attorney and the
client.32 6
An attorney's genuine feeling can change the case. In one case,
David Wymore wept as he told jurors tragedies from his client's life.32 7
Jurors started to cry with him. 32 8 Steven Curtis, one of the victims who
survived the shooting, found himself moved by Wymore's sincerity: "I
was beginning to believe it. This is crap! This is a serious flaw here!"32 9
The jury that had just convicted the defendant was not even close on a
death sentence: 9-3 for life.330
V.

A BROADER APPROACH

The research shows what factors matter to jurors when they vote
for life or for death. Defense lawyers should try to more broadly rank
jurors on these factors. I propose that attorneys work with a score sheet
similar to the ones I have created below. Using a score sheet like this
one, a defense attorney can question the juror on these topics and rank
them, using the Colorado Method's scale, on each of these topics. For
example, a lawyer may ask jurors about the heinousness of the murder
they will be called to evaluate. Some jurors will react more strongly to
that evidence: one juror, who would give the death penalty to any
murderer, would score a "seven." Another juror, who would admittedly
have a strong reaction to the heinousness of the crime, but who
indicates that they could look past it and still give someone a life
sentence, might be a "two" or a "three." A juror who says no matter
how bad the crime, they would still give a life sentence, would be a
"one." The lawyer would question jurors about other issues, such as
their ability to understand jury instructions. One juror might be
particularly receptive to and able to understand jury instructions, so
they would score a "one" or a "two" on that topic. Another juror might
have difficulty with the instructions, and be predisposed to ignore them.
They might score a "six" on that issue. Thus, the lawyer scores and
ranks each juror on each factor. With a completely filled-out score
sheet, the lawyer then assigns a final Colorado Method score.

326.
327.

Brewer, supra note 155, at 340, 356-57, 360; Trahan, supranote 58, at 175-80.
Parloff, supra note 13, at 89-90.

328. Id. at 90.
329. Id.
330. Id.
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JurorName and Number

Mitigation-Aggravation
1

Case-Specific Issues
Heinousness/Viciousness
A's history of violence
A's risk of future dangerousness
A's expression of remorse
Victim empathy
A's and/or victim's race
Juror-specific factors
Susceptibility to group pressure
Juror predisposition to impose
sentence
Ability to understand jury
instructions
Accept or deny responsibility for
the verdict
Juror's life experience
Views of expert testimony
Lingering doubt
Trusts defense counsel
Attorneyidentified factors

Colorado-Method Ranking

1 87

2

3

4

5

6

7
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JurorName and Number

Mitigation-Aggravation
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Case-Specific Issues
Heinousness/Viciousness

x
x

A's history of violence

x

A's risk of future dangerousness
A's expression of remorse

x
x

Victim empathy
A's and/or victim's race

x

Juror-specific factors
Susceptibility to group pressure
Juror predisposition to impose

x
x

sentence

x

Ability to understand jury
instructions
Accept or deny responsibility for
the verdict
Juror's life experience

x
x

Views of expert testimony

x

Lingering doubt

x

Trusts defense counsel
Attorney-identified factors

x

Colorado-Method Ranking

5

For example, I have filled out the chart for a sample juror. This juror
scored quite high, a "six," on the heinousness of the crime, future
dangerousness, and the juror's life experience. These are factors that
have been shown to be among the most significant in predicting a
juror's vote for death. But the juror also would respond favorably if the
defendant were to express remorse. The juror scores a "four" and "five"
on most other issues, so they clearly tilt toward death. Defense counsel
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would know how vicious the crime is and whether the defendant might
express remorse during the trial. In this case, say the defendant would
express sincere remorse, but the crime is quite heinous. The attorney
may balance these factors out and rate the juror as a "five" overall.
There are several advantages to this approach. Very few of
these topics directly involve the death penalty, which avoids
overemphasizing punishment with jurors before they have decided the
guilt question. Instead, this approach allows attorneys to question jurors
about the case-specific issues and the juror's unique personal
characteristics that the CJP research has shown affect their sentencing
determination. It also moves voir dire questions away from abstract
considerations of a juror's position on the death penalty to more
concrete and highly relevant factors that do not openly appear to jurors
as issues related to punishment.
That said, I do not advocate wholly abandoning discussing the
death penalty injury selection. The prosecution and the court will do it
anyway, especially if the defendant does not contest guilt. But in all
cases and in the innocence case particularly, my approach keeps
defense lawyers from excessively questioning jurors about the death
penalty and it helps them avoid creating the impression that everyone
in the room thinks a death sentence is a foregone conclusion.
There are some limitations to this approach. First, and perhaps
most importantly, courts often will not allow this kind of inquiry. Some
judges allocate minutes, not hours, to conduct capital jury voir dire. In
these cases, the Colorado Method may be the most feasible, if not the
only option. I suggest that a lawyer facing this situation argue for the
time to thoroughly question jurors, though I recognize the argument
may fail.
Second, this Article cannot account for all the factors that may
affect a given juror's vote for life or death, which could include strong
sympathies with law enforcement, prior experiences in the criminal
justice system, a relationship with a crime victim, an exposure to
pretrial publicity, or any other number of other factors. The form has
blank spaces on it because attorneys may want to add factors that are
unique to their case. They may also need to remove factors if they are
not applicable. While I have tried to canvas the literature, I recognize
that this list of factors is nowhere near comprehensive. This method is
limited to issues that have research-based support. Researchers have
not studied every possible factor that could relate to capital juror
decision-making. For many of these questions, there just are not
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answers. To some extent, this method remains like jury selection itself:
an imprecise and sometimes subjective endeavor.
Third, from the earliest conceptions of this piece, I have
questioned how attorneys would weigh various factors. We know that
the heinousness of the crime, fear of future dangerousness, and a
defendant's expression of remorse are among the strongest predictors
of a death or a life sentence. But how would an attorney rank these
factors against ones that have less predictability, such as a juror's
personality characteristics or life experiences or views of expert
witnesses? Without assigning statistically valid weights to each factor,
I am worried that attorneys would over- or underemphasize a factor on
the form.
Additionally, capital cases vary greatly and are difficult to fit into
a one-size-fits-all form. One cannot predict which factors might carry
greater weight in one case versus another. An attorney whose client
killed multiple victims in a particularly tortuous way may weigh
heinousness greater than an attorney whose client is highly remorseful.
Attorneys may want to assign weights in their case, but I did not feel I
could quantitatively assign numbers without further testing. I recognize
the statistical shortcomings associated with the ad hoc ranking this
Article proposes. This is where the Colorado Method's simplicity
shines. But defense attorneys already make judgments on the fly with
the Colorado Method. This system merely expands the number of
factors attorneys would consider in making their Colorado Method
numerical ranking choice.
I add one caution. I propose attorneys have genuinely open,
candid, careful, and sensitive conversations with jurors about some of
the most deeply personal events in their lives. This requires an
empathetic approach. Many capital defense attorneys might struggle
adopting it as their personalities tend toward the use of more aggressive
litigation strategies. I believe an attorney who attempted this method
without tact, genuineness, and openness would find that jurors would
sense the attorney's lack of sincerity, refuse to disclose relevant
information, and feel manipulated. It may seriously jeopardize the
client's case.
Also, as I have already explained, many attorneys are more
comfortable with the Colorado Method. Its simplicity may be its
biggest strength and many attorneys would rather stick with a known,
workable strategy. I do not denigrate the method.
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However, I anticipate that most attorneys using a form like this
Article has proposed will, when faced with a decision to argue a causebased challenge or to exercise a peremptory challenge, be grateful they
have much more information at their disposal. They can compare their
scores with each other. Aware of the research findings and, with the best
information in hand, they can make a holistic choice. This is not
intended to be, nor could it be, a method to precisely predict how jurors
will vote. It is only intended to offer lawyers a better and more rounded
predictive tool.
Finally, I have not empirically tested these factors to see their
applicability in real-world settings. I believe this could be done,
however, if attorneys filled out a form such as this on an actual case
and then subsequently tested whether their rankings correlated with
jurors' final votes, especially studying which rankings proved to be the
most predictive of sentencing outcomes. Without further quantitative
testing, this proposal remains speculative. I anticipate, however, that
further study would confirm the merits of the broader consideration I
propose, simply because it is derived from evidence-based findings.
V.

CONCLUSION

"A system that would take life must first give justice," John J.
Curtin, Jr., then President of the American Bar Association, told the
Senate Judiciary Committee in 1991.331 I have proposed a more
expanded procedure defense attorneys can use when they select capital
juries. But this is a panacea.
In 1966, the preeminent legal scholars Harry Kalven Jr. and Hans
Zeisel wrote that even the best procedural changes and innovations
designed to remedy the concerns about "evenhanded justice" in the
administration of the death penalty would "remain demeaningly trivial
compared to the stakes."33 2 They concluded that "no human should be
called upon" to decide whether a person deserves death. 3 3
It is a decision no human being can make. We just are not "capable
of deciding who should live or die in accordance with the law."334
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Especially with a 68% error rate in capital cases," CJP research shows
that jurors cannot "decid[e] who deserves the death penalty in the way
the U.S. Supreme Court has held the [C]onstitution requires."336 As
Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote, "the task of selecting in some
objective way those persons who should be condemned to die is one
that remains beyond the capacities of the criminal justice system."3 3 7
Defense attorneys do not have the capacities to make these calls either.
No one should be expected to do the impossible. This proposed method
of capital jury selection should be short-lived. It should end when we
decide to abolish the death penalty once and for all.
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